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Of Cold Steel and Blueprints: Musings of an Old Country
Lawyer on Crime, Jurisprudence, and The Tribal Attorney's
Role in Developing Tribal Sovereignty
G. William Rice
Far best is he who knows all things
himself;
Good, he that hearkens when men
counsel right;
But he who neither knows, nor lays to
heart
Another's wisdom, is a useless wight.'
I. Introduction
Three decades ago, a new generation of
Indian lawyers began to emerge from the law
schools of this country. This "first genera-
tion" 2 of Indian lawyers has exerted a tremen-
dous impact upon tribal government, federal
Indian law, and those who are coming after us.3
We were generally young, smart, brash, irrev-
erent, and unwilling to take "no" for an answer
from the federal bureaucracy. Some had never
met an attorney prior to entering law school.
Those lucky enough to have someone in their
family who had attended a college or universi-
ty could generally look to a World War II
Veteran father or uncle who had used their GI
benefits to be the first in our family, and often
the first in our Tribes, to obtain a bachelor's
degree at an institution of higher learning.
These men, and their warrior parents and
grandparents were our role models and inspira-
tion. Kirke Kickingbird captured the feelings
of many of us as we began our law school and
legal careers:
Our great grandfathers and
sometimes our grandfathers as young
teenagers, had fought the last of the
Indian wars at the close of the
American frontier. We understood
battle and the warrior tradition. Many
of us came from the nobility and
aristocracy of our people, and like the
southern aristocrats after the Civil War,
we knew the bitter taste of defeat. We
did not have the good fortune to
encounter genteel poverty. (Look at
the last three U.S. Census' economic
statistics on American Indian income.)
We encountered crushing poverty.
And if it was not our immediate
personal experience, it was the
experience of our families, our
relatives, and our tribes.
We understood the power of the
law and its use as a defensive and
offensive weapon. Our contribution to
the War on Poverty would be a legal
battle. We felt like bronze age warriors
given the gift of a Damascus steel
blade. No enemy could stand before
us. We shared Deloria's cynical humor
when he twisted the Civil Rights
Movement's anthem, "We shall
overcome," into "We shall overrun."
And when our friends took the anthem
too literally, as at Wounded Knee,
lawyers were needed more than ever.4
As we embarked upon our careers, and
gained experience as attorneys, we often faced
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the dichotomy which existed between our roles
as attorneys, and our station as very young -
and, thus, often almost irrelevant - members
of our tribal communities. As attorneys we
were expected to be knowledgeable, competent
practitioners of the legal arts and had been
taught in law school that we should always
have a ready and correct answer. As young
tribal members, we generally did not have the
life experience or cultural knowledge required
for our elders to even bother to ask us the rele-
vant question until after they had already made
a decision. 5
Many of us soon came to realize that we
were that blade of
Damascus steel, and that Ideally, Tribal a
to be effective and fulfill
the promise we held as those positions
the new generation of in the case at is
briefcase warriors, 6 we enhance the sov
were obliged to place the th
handle of the sword and
control over our actions
into the hands of our people. Walking then,
with one foot in both worlds, we balanced our
duty as attorneys to represent our clients using
our independent professional judgement7 with
our responsibility to defer on cultural and poli-
cy issues to the judgment of our elders. We
became the instruments of tribal policy makers.
In time, many assumed leadership roles, laying
the foundation for new or long suppressed
directions in tribal policy as we conveyed to our
peoples the knowledge we had gained as attor-
neys. In effect, we have become teachers, stu-
dents, leaders, and warriors, and some of us are







Is this, then, the sine qua non of the tribal
attorney? Perhaps. It is certainly an honorable
thing to bring to the Indian community knowl-
edge of their legal rights, and to be an advocate
for the Indian people in tribal, federal, and state
courts. Yet, willingly or unwillingly, knowing-
ly or unknowingly, tribal attorneys build and
shape the contextual arena within which the
next generation of battles will be fought in the
continuing struggle for tribal sovereignty. The
role of a tribal attorney is, and ought to be, both
an advocate for, and architect of, the sovereign-
ty of the Tribes.
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The role as advocate is well-known.
Training is completed; skills are honed to a
razor-edge; for days
ys should adopt before the battle prepara-
tions are made.
will both prevail Willingly the advocate
et maintain and steps into the maw of
ty of the Tribe in controversy ready and
Ire able to defend and pro-
mote the interests of the
client. Bruised and bat-
tered, the advocate returns with their shield or
upon it. Yet a true warrior does not rush
thoughtlessly into battle. A true warrior pro-
motes, protects, and defends the interest of their
peopleY
One must understand, however, that to pre-
vail in court or in the halls of Congress is not
always to promote the overall interest of Indian
people in tribal sovereignty, and can sometimes
be directly adverse to it. n0 It is incumbent upon
Tribal attorneys to consider not only the merits
of the arguments which could be made in a par-
ticular case, but also their long term affect upon
the sovereignty of the Tribe should they prevail
upon those arguments. Ideally, Tribal attorneys
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should adopt those positions which will both
prevail in the case at issue, yet maintain and
enhance the sovereignty of the Tribe in the
future. To do so, Tribal attorneys must keep in
mind, in both the advice they give to tribal
decision makers and the positions they advance
in court, their role as developers of Tribal sov-
ereignty.'1 It is then to our role as architects of
tribal sovereignty that our attention should now
turn.
II. Architects of Tribal Jurisprudence
A. Drawing Fine Lines with Blunt
Pencils
Amidst the humdrum variations in tribal
representation - throwing out the bingo
bandits, political disputes, arguing with the
BIA, 12 political disputes, arguing with the
IHS, 13  political disputes, litigating
jurisdictional issues with the State, political
disputes - it is easy to miss the opportunity to
make a worthwhile contribution to tribal
sovereignty, as these opportunities often come
in disguise. The Tribal Chairman's nephew
started a fist-fight with his cousin at the
powwow (again) and was arrested by the tribal
police. He has been put in the tribal jail five
times in the last six years for the same thing.
Everyone wants such conduct stopped. Now
what? An old man and his juvenile grandson
are arrested for severely beating a young man
who entered the old man's Indian house
without permission. Several tribal elders come
to your office protesting the arrest on the
grounds that the old man must be out ofjail for
a tribal ceremony next Friday since he is the
only one authorized to conduct a portion of that
ceremony. The old man cannot or will not
make bail. Now what? A young woman runs
off with her sister's husband, and the wife and
her relatives start tracking them. His relatives
respond in kind. There are three requests for
emergency protective orders, a divorce case,
six criminal cases of assault and battery, eight
criminal cases for malicious mischief or
destruction of private property, and close to
twenty (at last count) civil actions for damages
filed in the tribal court all arising out of this
incident, and the parties show no signs of
eschewing similar behavior in the future. Now
what? 1
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It would seem that our training as attor-
neys, and our role as advocates, would compel
us to file appropriate criminal or juvenile
charges and prosecute the assailant(s) in each
case, leaving the "victims" to pursue their pri-
vate legal remedies for the wrongs done to
them. These examples illustrate some of the
significant deficiencies in an Americanized
justice system. First, how is wrongful and dis-
ruptive conduct to be deterred when the perpe-
trator is willing to accept the statutory penalty
proscribed for such conduct - can moral
thoughts and conduct be legislated? 15 Second,
the Americanized justice system has extreme
difficultly dealing with - or even formally
acknowledging - concepts of community or
group needs, rights, or responsibilities which
are affected by its processes. In addition, the
American system of justice often requires a
plethora of lawsuits to resolve a single inci-
dent. Finally, the adversarial system is direct-
ed only at conduct, 16 generally leaving the
underlying causes of personal conflict unre-
solved, and often contributing to long term
continuation of personal controversies via its
winner-loser approach to justice. It is, of
course, obvious that we should also question
whether our use of the adversarial system of
"justice" within our communities is beneficial,
Rice
or whether it is destructive of the unique cul-
tural and philosophical attitudes and beliefs
that define the very essence of our peoples.' 7
When these problems become apparent,
Grandma is likely to ask "Why do we have a
criminal code anyway?"
Sometimes the simple questions are the
most difficult.
The simple answer to Grandma's question,
of course, is that that is the way the white peo-
ple do it.18 That is the way we are trained in
law school, and most of us have not thought
much past the basic reasons given in the law
school textbooks for the criminal justice
system. 19 A more thoughtful answer might be
that the Secretary of the Interior, when he drew
the first rules for the original Courts of Indian
Offenses, included a criminal code in his regu-
lations,20 and the Tribe was required to have a
similar structure before the Secretary would
recognize the Tribal Court and close his Court
of Indian Offenses for the Tribe. 21 If we aspire
to the development of an Indian tribal law
which is truly in our own image, the best
answer may be "because the Duke of
Normandy invaded medieval England and won
the day at the battle of Hastings in 1066. ",22 To
fully understand why we were trained as we
were in law school, and perhaps more impor-
tantly the assumptions behind such training, we
must delve into the cultural assumptions, cus-
toms, traditions, and history of the Americans
underlying the creation of their system. In
order for Tribal Attorneys to adequately assist
the Tribes in the development of their own trib-
al jurisprudence which is consistent with the
cultural assumptions and history of the Tribe,
we must recognize and attempt to understand
the basic assumptions of the American legal
system and the reasons for its existence.
The problem, of course, is where to start.
The search for the source of the criminal
justice system amongst the antiquities of
Western Civilization is perhaps fruitless, as the
available translations and scholarly literature
has already been filtered through culturally
biased eyes. However, a short synopsis of the
reported aspects of the laws of ancient civiliza-
tions of the "western" world will be useful in
understanding the later development of the
American system of justice. Given the perva-
sive influence of the Judeo-Christian ethic
upon those who would become the Americans,
it may be well to begin our inquiry at the place
from which their religion has its source -
Babylon.
B. Once upon a time on a Continent far,
far away .... 2
[T]he law's future is bounded by
law's past. The future law is the law
that we will come to see. Because our
sight is limited by what we are able to
pick out based on our past sightings,
future law will necessarily have to do
with us - our needs, our goals, our
plans, our visions - all of which are
limited, even nearsighted.2
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While the Babylonian and Assyrian peo-
ples apparently had recognizable legal "codes"
since the beginnings of their civilization, 25
practically all we know of that which could
later be classified as "criminal" comes directly
from the code which King Hammurabi
received from his god.2 6 Amongst the penal-
ties recognized by the Code of Hammurabi are
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death,27 mutilation,2 8 and scourging.29 Other
known forms of penalties imposed by the Code
of Hammurabi for various forms of conduct
include banishment, restitution (both simple
and in some cases up to thirty times the dam-
ages found), voidance of claims at law for
attempting self-help justice, and simple com-
pensation.30 While the King and other high
officials probably acted as judges on occasion,
and professional judges were known from
antiquity,31 it seems that there was no clear
conception of a "criminal offense" against the
state which could be distinguished from pro-
viding an avenue of formalized retaliation or
restitution for the victim, for the victim of
wrongful conduct could effectively pardon the
perpetrator even though the Code of
Hammurabi required the death penalty.32
It may be fairly argued, however, that the
vaunted Code of Hammurabi is not a code at
all, at least in the sense in which the word
"code" is now understood by lawyers as a leg-
islative act, but is rather a compendium of
"dooms" or "judgments" which Hammurabi
had made.33 In order to consider this possibil-
ity seriously, one need only remove the section
numbers inserted by the translators and hear
the words of Hammurabi himself from the
stele:
[The Gods establish a high rank
for Babylon] . . . and Bel call me by
name, Hammurabi, the high prince,
god-fearing, to exemplify justice in the
land, to banish the proud and
oppressor, that the great should not
despoil the weak, to rise like the sun
over the black-headed race (mankind)
and illumine the land, to give health to
all flesh. Hammurabi the (good)
shepherd, the choice of Bel, am I...
[there follows a long list of his
achievements] ... When Marduk [God
who rules mankind] brought me to
direct all people and commissioned me
to give judgment, I laid down justice
and right in the provinces, I made all
flesh to prosper. Then if a man has
accused another of laying a nertu
(death spell) upon him, but has not
proved it, he shall be put to death; if a
.. slave has said to his master, "You
are not my master," he shall be brought
to account as his slave, and his master
shall cut off his ear. The judgments of
righteousness which Hammurabi, the
powerful king, settled, and caused the
land to receive a sure polity and a
gracious rule... The oppressed who
has a suit to prosecute may come
before my image, that of a righteous
king, and read my inscription and
understand my precious words and
may my stele elucidate his case. Let
him see the law he seeks .... 34
It does not appear that there is any clear dis-
tinction between wrongs that are "criminal"
and wrongs that are "tortious," although there
clearly exists a recognizable system for the res-
olution of disputes 35 and the imposition of per-
missible, ritualized, or common sanctions for
those who wrong another.36
Abram, later to be named Abraham as the
founder of the Jewish people and the Judaic
religion, was a native of Ur 37 within the terri-
tory governed by Babylon. 38  Abraham's
grandson, Jacob, returned to Haran in
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Mesopotamia39 to find a wife, and there mar-
ried Leah and Rachel from whom descended
the twelve tribes of Israel. 40 Moses, of course,
received a written code directly from his God
in the form of the Ten Commandments,4t and a
series of "judgements"42 which echoed many
of the provisions of Hammurabi's Code of
judgments.4 3  Likewise, the Jewish people
received judges who were to judge the people 44
and who attained some of the "Kingly" traits of
a Mesopotamian ruler.45 Of course David,
Israel's great King, personally implemented
judgement and justice among his people,46 as
did Jehoshaphat and other Jewish Kings both
personally and via regularly appointed judicial
officers. 47 Yet, even as late as the Roman peri-
od, there appears to be no clearly defined con-
cept of crime in the sense of an offense against
the state for which the state may demand pun-
ishment.48
In the early Greco-Roman world, kings are
seen as the possessors of Themistes, or divine-
ly dictated judgements given by god to the
kings for their use upon need.49 After the
development of regular "judicial" officers, they
are seen not necessarily as the successors of the
prerogative of the king in the sense of individ-
ual divine inspiration for each sentence, but as
the oligarchy which claims to monopolize the
knowledge of the laws. 50 Of course the publi-
cation of Roman law in the Twelve Tables, and
other writings, in some ways broke the monop-
oly of knowledge as the Code of Hammurabi
had done for the Babylonians but not the
monopoly of authority. We do know somewhat
of the procedure of suits in the Roman period
through the Legis Actio Sacramenti, the font of
the later Roman Law of Actions.5 1
The subject of litigation is
supposed to be in Court. If it is
moveable, it is actually there. If it is
immoveable, a fragment or sample of
it is brought in its place; land, for
instance, is represented by a clod, a
house by a single brick. In the
example selected by Gaius, the suit is
for a slave. The proceeding begins by
the plaintiffs advancing with a rod,
which, as Gaius expressly tells,
symbolised [sic] a spear. He lays hold
of the slave and asserts a right to him
with the words, "Hunc ego hominen ex
Jure Quiritium meum esse dico
secundum suam causam sicut dixi;"
and then saying, "Ecce tibi Vindictam
imposui," he touches him with the
spear. The defendant goes through the
same series of acts and gestures. On
this the Praetor intervenes, and bids the
litigants relax their hold, "Mittite ambo
hominem." They obey, and the plaintiff
demands from the defendant the reason
of his interference, "Postulo anne
dicas qua ex causa vindicaveris," a
question which is replied to by a fresh
assertion of right, "Jus peregi sicut
vindictam imposui." On this, the first
claimant offers to stake a sum of
money, called a Sacramentum, on the
justice of his own case, "Quando tu
injuia provocasti, D aeris Sacramento
te provoco," and the defendant, in the
phrase "Similiter ego te," accepts the
wager. The subsequent proceedings
were no longer of a formal kind, but it
is to be observed that the Praetor took
security for the Sacramentum, which
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always went into the coffers of the
State.
Such was the necessary preface of
every ancient Roman suit. It is
impossible, I think, to refuse assent to
the suggestion of those who see in it a
dramatization of the Origin of Justice.
Two armed men are wrangling about
some disputed property. The Praetor,
vir pietate gravis, happens to be going
by, and interposes to stop the contest.
The disputants state their case to him,
and agree that he shall arbitrate
between them, it being arranged that
the loser, besides resigning the subject
of the quarrel, shall pay a sum of
money to the umpire as remuneration
for his trouble and loss of time. This
interpretation would be less plausible
than it is, were it not that, by a
surprising coincidence, the ceremony
described by Gaius as the imperative
course of proceeding in a Legis Actio
is substantially the same with one of
the two subjects which the God
Hephaestus is described by Homer as
moulding [sic] into the First
Compartment of the Shield of
Achilles. In the Homeric trial-scene,
the dispute, as if expressly intended to
bring out the characteristics of
primitive society, is not about property
but about the composition for a
homicide.52
Thus, early Roman law did not view wrongs
between people as wrongs against the state, but
as controversies which the state should resolve.
Maine explains that the earliest conception, in
the Roman Republic, of crimin or Crime was
that of:
an act involving such high issues that
the State, instead of leaving its
cognisance to the civil tribunal or the
religious court, directed a special law
or privilegium against the perpetrator.
Every indictment therefore took the
form of a bill of pains and penalties,
and the trial of a criminal was a
proceeding wholly extraordinary,
wholly irregular, wholly independent
of settled rules and fixed conditions.
Consequently, both for the reason that
the tribunal dispensing justice was the
sovereign state itself and also for the
reason that no classification of the acts
prescribed or forbidden was possible,
there was not at this epoch any Law of
crimes, any criminal jurisprudence. 53
By the time Caesar had begun the Roman
invasion of Gaul, including Normandy and
Brittany,54 the Romans had begun the develop-
ment of the concept of the "crime against the
people" in the Lex Calpurnia de Repetundis
which established a permanent commission to
deal with claims to recover money improperly
taken from provencials by a Governor-
General. 55 During the decay of the Republic,
these permanent commissions multiplied as
each new set of "crimes" gave rise to a new
permanent commission to try and punish viola-
tors of the legislation establishing the commis-
sion and prohibiting certain conduct - legisla-
tion often used to fulfill political ends. 56 The
decline of the Roman Republic and the rise of
the Roman Emperors meant that the appoint-
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ment of judges and trial of cases became cen-
tralized in the Emperor and his council. 57 As
Rome secured its grasp on Gaul and portions of
Britain,58 the Emperors again become the font
of all "justice," and in awful majesty could
decree whether a man lived or died. Augustus
Caesar (63 B.C.-A.D. 14) was deified shortly
after his death, and later Caesars were deified
during their lives, again intertwining the notion
of the god-king doing justice for his people.59
The conversion of Emperor Constantine
(A.D. 275-337) to Christianity in about A.D.
312 set the stage for the rise of the Church as a
major power in the western world.60 While the
Roman Empire proper collapsed in the west in
A.D. 476,61 its vertically integrated power
structure and the rise of the Church as a politi-
cal and religious power remained thoroughly
ingrained in the culture and tradition of the
region.62 In A.D. 800, Pope Leo III crowned
Charlemagne as Emperor of the Romans,
thereby re-establishing the Holy Roman
Empire which would exist in various forms
until 1806.63 Charlemagne firmly established
the feudal tenure system, including its ruthless-
ly vertical power structure. 64  Shortly after
Charlemagne's death in A.D. 814,65 the
Norsemen (Normans) invaded France, and by
the 900s had colonized that area of France now
known as Normandy. By A.D. 911, the
Normans had adopted French custom, become
Christians, and their chief had entered into the
feudal service of the Frankish king, Charles the
Simple. 66 Maine would describe this stage in
the development of the power structure of the
time as it relates to the development of the
criminal law thusly:
[T]he development of the criminal law
was universally hastened by two
causes, the memory of the Roman
Empire and the influence of the
Church. On the one hand traditions of
the majesty of the Caesars, perpetuated
by the temporary ascendency of the
House of Charlemagne, were
surrounding Sovereigns with a prestige
which a mere barbarous chieftain
could never otherwise have acquired
and were communicating to the pettiest
feudal potentate the character of
guardian of society and representative
of the State. On the other hand, the
Church, in its anxiety to put a curb on
sanguinary ferocity, sought about for
authority to punish the graver
misdeeds, and found it in those
passages of Scripture which speak with
approval of the powers of punishment
committed to the civil magistrate. The
New Testament was appealed to as
proving that secular rules exist for the
terror of evil-doers; the Old Testament,
as laying down that "whoso sheddeth
man's blood, by man shall his blood be
shed." There can be no doubt, I
imagine, that modern ideas on the
subject of crime as based upon two
assumptions contended for by the
church in the Dark Ages - first, that
each feudal ruler, in his degree, might
be assimilated to the Roman
Magistrates spoken of by Saint Paul;
and, next, that the offences which he
was to chastise were those selected for
prohibition in the Mosaic
Commandments, or rather such of
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them as the Church did not reserve to
her own cognisance.
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On the other hand, the people whom the
Caesars invaded in France and Britain came in
part from Celtic stock, having spread from
Austria throughout France, Portugal, Spain,
and Britain. 68 The populations of Celts who
inhabited Ireland, Scotland, Wales, southwest
England, and Brittany in what is now France
were the only Celtic peoples who retained their
own culture relatively intact in the face of the
Roman onslaught.69 Other than the research of
archeologists and reports of the Greeks and
Romans, 70 however, little is known of their
society as they had no early system of writ-
ing.7 1 What we do know comes mainly from
extrapolation from the conflict between the
"old" customs of England and the rules
imposed by William the Conqueror.
The stage was set for the Norman invasion
of Britain.
Il. An Island for the Duke
Duke William of Normandy, as successor
to his Norman forebears, owed feudal service
to the King of France. Obviously, an exposi-
tion of the feudal system is beyond the scope of
this work. However, William and his Barons
brought the feudal system in its full glory with
them as they conquered England, and a few
words will shed at least some light on the sub-
ject of this survey.
One of the dominant notions of the day
was that of service. Land was not simply an
estate. It was inextricably intertwined with the
idea that one owed service (military assistance,
labor, money, personal services, etc.) to the
superior through whom one possessed the
land: 72
The public organization of England,
for example, was derived from the fact
that all the land in the country was held
by a certain number of tenants-in-
chief, including ecclesiastical
incorporations and boroughs, from the
king, while all the rest of the
population consisted either of under-
tenants or of persons settled on the land
of some tenant and amenable to
jurisdiction through the latter. In other
West-European countries the
distribution of the people was more
intricate and confused because there
had been no wholesale conquest
capable of reducing conditions to
uniformity, but the fundamental facts
were the same. Every West-European
country was arranged on the basis of
feudal land-tenure.
The acts constituting the feudal
contract were called homagium and
investitures. The tenant had to appear
in person before the lord surrounded
by his court, to kneel before him and to
put his folded bands into the hand of
the lord, saying: "I swear to be faithful
and attached to you as a man should be
to his lord." He added sometimes: "I
will do so as long as I am your man and
as I hold your land" (Saxon Lehnrecht,
ch. 3). To this act of homage
corresponded the "investiture" by the
lord, who delivered to his vassal a flag,
a staff, a charter or some other symbol
of the property conceded. There were
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many variations according to localities
and, of course, the ceremony differed
in the case of a person of base status.
Yet even a villein received his yard-
land or ox-gang from the steward of a
lord after swearing an oath of fealty
and in the form of an "admittance" by
the staff, of which a record was kept in
the rolls of the manorial court: hence
the copyhold tenure of English law.
73
Another important consideration within
this long tradition of vertical allegiance culmi-
nating in the person of an all-powerful King,74
owed fealty by all, was the concept of the
"King's peace." Originally, the "King's peace"
attached only to the King's house, and his
attendants, servants, and other persons upon
whom he bestowed his special protection. 75
After the Norman conquest, it appears that the
King's peace 76 expanded until it became a nor-
mal and general safeguard of the public
order.77 This change is important because a
violation of the "King's peace" meant that one
had been disloyal in the worst feudal sense -
it was felony, high treason, a direct affront to
the majesty and person of the King thus requir-
ing all his loyal subjects to rise in righteous
wrath to protect him. Even as late as 1769,
Blackstone would describe in terms of homage
and fealty, the rationale for the crime of treason
(and other felonies) as a violation of the true
and faithful allegiance owed to a person's sov-
ereign liege lord, the King. 78
The doing of homage 79 between lord and
vassal80 created a mutual "contractual" and
"legal" bond of trust in the highest degree
between lord and man so that the lord owed the
man protection in the estate held by the man
"of' the lord and in his person, as the man
owed the lord service and reverence.,, It is
from this reverence owed by the man to the
lord, and the jurisdiction the lord obtained over
the man to enforce it,8 2 which gave rise to that
distinctly feudal crime - felony:8 3
[Felony) covered only the specifically
feudal crimes, those crimes which
were breaches of the feudal nexus and
which would work a forfeiture or
escheat of the fief, or, as the case might
be, of the lordship; for the lord might
be guilty of felony against his man just
as the man might be guilty of felony
against his lord. A mere common
crime, however wicked and base, mere
wilful homicide, or theft, is not a
felony; there must be some breach of
that faith and trust which ought to exist
between lord and man. Now it would
seem that for a while the word was
used here as well as elsewhere in this
restricted sense; in the Leges Henrici
felonia is one among many crimes. A
little later it seems to cover every crime
of any considerable gravity, and seems
to have no reference whatever to the
feudal bond, save in one respect,
namely, that the felon's land escheats
to his lord; nay, a charge offelonia has
become an indispensable part of every
charge of every crime that is to be
punished by death or mutilation. The
details of this process are obscure.
Possibly the lords saw no harm in a
change which brought them abundant
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escheats . . . . All the hatred and
contempt which are behind the word
felon are enlisted against the criminal,
murderer, robber, thief, without
reference to any breach of the bond of
homage and fealty.
8 4
Yet there remained a substratum of that
autonomous legal custom of the Celts over
which these feudal precepts of the Normans
were laid and intertwined. Early Anglo-Saxon
law and custom was that of the feud, to be
compromised through the payment of compen-
sation denoted as the wergild, literally a "man's
price" or "man-payment"
while lesser injuries than
death had been the sub- [T]he defendc
ject of elaborate tariffs85 literally bet th
describing the amounts to
be paid to the injured the jury verdi
party or his heir for compem
offenses committed
against him.86  These
customs8 7 have been described as follows:
Of the more ancient system we shall
say but little. On the eve of the
Norman Conquest what we may call
the criminal law of England (but it was
also the law of 'torts' or civil wrongs)
contained four elements which deserve
attention; its past history had in the
main consisted of the varying relations
between them. We have to speak of
outlawry, of the blood-feud, of the
tariffs of wer and bot and wite, of
punishment, of punishment in life and
limb. As regards the malefactor, the





attitudes: it may make war upon him, it
may leave him exposed to the
vengeance of those whom he has
wronged, it may suffer him to make
atonement, it may inflict on him a
determinate punishment, death,
mutilation, or the like.
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The slow but steady amalgamation of the old
with the new resulted in four different, yet
related, forms of action designed to remedy
wrongs done: the appeal of felony, the writ of
trespass, the indictment of felony, and the
indictment of trespass.8 9 The appeal of felony,
still extant in Blackstone's day,90 was not an
appeal to a higher court
but rather an original
d his relatives action through which a
'ndant 's life on private citizen obtained
hey refused to redress upon the wrong-
e victim doer by a private prose-cution for a felony. As
in the writ of trespass,
9
'
in which the victim requested damages, an
appeal of felony could neither be dismissed nor
pardoned by the King, but only by the victim or
the victim's heir entitled to bring the appeal. 92
Further, an appeal of felony could be brought
after a defendant had been acquitted, or found
guilty and pardoned (not punished), at the suit
of the King upon indictment, but no indictment
could be brought by the King after an acquittal
upon an appeal of felony.93 The private victim-
prosecutor ran some risk in that the defendant
could demand trial by battle,94 and the victim-
prosecutor could be killed. Further, if the
action were lost, the prosecutor would be fined
in a small amount by the king. They were
attractive, however, in that so long as such
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actions could be settled out of court, the defen-
dant and his relatives literally bet the defen-
dant's life on the jury verdict if they refused to
compensate the victim. 95
In contrast to the appeal of felony and the
writ of trespass, indictments of felony and
indictments of trespass were actions controlled
by the King's officers. In both these actions,
the victim had no say in whether the defendant
was prosecuted to judgment or thereafter par-
doned.96  Successful prosecutions resulted,
absent a pardon, in the execution of the wrong-
doer. The wrongdoer's goods were forfeited to
the king upon conviction,97 and upon entry of
judgment the rent and
profits of his lands [O]ne's stati
belonged to the king for
one year (including what- upon how clo
ever the king could make ruling Monar,
from wasting the land), tion within th
and the lands thereafter
escheated to the wrong-
doer's lord.98  Pardons,
however, had value both in money and favors
owed, and when an appeal of felony was settled
out of court, the king lost both revenues and
personal obligations important for his crown.99
The ability of the victim-prosecutor to negoti-
ate a solution to the problem acceptable to him
was finally outlawed by statute,100 and the
appeal of felony slowly fell into disuse as its
benefits in obtaining just compensation disap-
peared and its possible adverse consequences
remained. It slowly became dormant, and was
replaced by the indictment of trespass con-
trolled by the King's officers.10' Thereafter the
only remedy left to the victim was the writ of





IV. The Alien Invasion
A. Nina, Pinta, Sancta Maria, & One
That Fell Off the Edge
By the time the English began their inva-
sion of our lands in what is now called the
United States, several prominent features of
their society could be discerned from their cus-
toms and traditions. On the religious front, the
invaders were, in the main, participants in vari-
ous Christian 0 3 sects whose roots lay in the
Roman-Jewish-Babylonian empires. 10 4 While
disputes remained as to the precise domains of
church and secular law, the separation of the
Church of England from the Catholic Church of
Rome prevented, at least
after the reign of Henry
life depended the Eighth, the continued
e came to the interference of the
title andposi- Church of Rome in the
government of
amidal society England. 0 5  Thus,
instead of the church
being a competitor for
power within the English system, England had
once again returned to the ethic of the god-
King,'0 6 a convergence of religious and secular
rule in one human person, 10 7 in the tradition of
Hammurabi and the Ceasars.
In the secular arena, English society
appears to have been ranked according to a
rather severe class pyramid with the Monarch
at its feudal apex. Not only was all land in pri-
vate ownership held, ultimately, "of the
King,"'1 8 the holding of such lands was inter-
twined with one's rank and status. 10 9
Ultimately, from the most lordly Baron to the
lowliest villain,110 every person owed personal
allegiance, obedience, and deference to the
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King and his liege lord, and, in turn, expected
to receive such allegiance, obedience, and def-
erence from his tenants and villains as well as
others of lesser rank whom he deemed his infe-
riors. Thus, one's station in life depended upon
how close one came to the ruling Monarch in
title and position within this pyramidal society,
resulting in a social system where personal
honor and importance depended almost exclu-
sively upon class, rank, and wealth. It would
not, perhaps, be an exaggeration to suggest that
their social development had regressed to the
point that - at least prior to their contact with
Indian people - they could not conceive of a
system of social control, i.e., a government,
which was not based upon rank, wealth, and
force."II
Within this structure, the old remedies of
the victim for wrongs done were slowly being
consumed by the King's courts. The appeal of
felony, while still technically available, had
fallen into disuse. The ancient remedies of vic-
tims to demand compensation for the offense
against them in preference to the King's ability
to prosecute and receive the profits of the pros-
ecution had been outlawed. The King was in
the final process of consolidating his hold upon
the system of justice generally by reducing the
jurisdictional authorities of the nobles, and of
solidifying his grip upon the revenues available
from the punishment of "crimes" by limiting
the rights of victims to the writ of trespass. 112
In short, the idea of the crime against the
Crown had begun to take shape.
The problem, of course, is that Indian
Nations never had a King.
B. Of Colonists, Pioneers, and Felons
Transported
When we study the lives of the great pio-
neers of Australia and America we see that
they were almost all born criminals, pirates, or
assassins, whose excessive fondness for action,
strife, carnage, and novelty, which would have
been an immense danger for their country,
found a useful outlet in the midst of tribes of
savages. '13
While the American legend states that the
early colonists were pious Christians intent on
seeking religious freedom in a new land, that
legend usually fails to recall that many of the
early invaders were de jure outlaws in
England."14 Blackstone reports that transporta-
tion to America for a term from seven years to
life was a standard punishment for perjury,
subornation of perjury, 1 5 and most felonies
other than high treason, upon claiming the ben-
efit of clergy to avoid execution. 16 Mr. Justice
Story described the attitude of the early
"colonists" and their reasons for invading
Indian Country as follows:
It is difficult to perceive, why their
[Indian Nations] title was not, in this
respect, as well founded as the title of
any other nation, to the soil within its
own boundaries. . . . especially as to
countries in the possession of native
inhabitants and tribes at the time of the
discovery, it seems difficult to
perceive, what ground of right any
discovery could confer. It would seem
strange to us, if, in the present times,
the natives of the South Sea Islands, or
of Cochin China, should, by making a
voyage to, and a discovery of, the
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United States, on that account set up a
right to the soil within our boundaries.
The truth is, that the European
nations paid not the slightest regard to
the rights of the native tribes. They
treated them as mere barbarians and
heathens, whom, if they were not at
liberty to extirpate, they were entitled
to deem mere temporary occupants of
the soil. They might convert them to
Christianity; and, if they refused
conversion, they might drive them
from the soil, as unworthy to inhabit it.
They affected to be governed by the
desire to promote the cause of
Christianity, and were aided in this
ostensible object by the whole
influence of the Papal power. But their
real object was, to extend their own
power, and increase their own wealth,
by acquiring the treasures, as well as
the territory, of the New World.
Avarice and ambition were at the
bottom of all their original
enterprises. 1
7
As suggested by Lombroso and Justice Story, it
was perhaps more politic for the King to send
the dissenters and the criminals from his king-
dom in England to the colonies in America
under the charge of his loyal, greedy vassals
(some of whom would be Barons and Lords,
and thus tenants-in-chief of the King within the
English system) than to deal with them at
home."18 It is reasonably certain that the King
considered such a course of action more prof-
itable to the Crown.
Whether their cause in coming to the
Indian Country was to avoid the lawful religion
of England, to avoid execution as a criminal, or
simply to pirate their fortune, it is clear that the
"adventurers" and "pioneers" who began the
English invasion did so within the forms of
their own customs and traditions." 9 It would
seem to be beyond cavil to deduce that English
people would bring English ways with them as
they moved to colonize a foreign land. In this
regard, a review of the form of some of the
early Charters issued for the establishment of
colonies will be illustrative of the feudal roots
of the English colonies in America, and the
transfer of the English custom and tradition to
those colonies. 12
0
The thirteen colonies which would form
the original United States of America were
governed, at least by the time of the revolution,
under either a Provincial, Proprietary, or
Corporate Charter form of government. 12 1 The
Provincial form of government was directly
and wholly under the pleasure and authority of
the King, and existed at the time of the
Revolution in New Hampshire, New York,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Georgia although some of these had earlier
been governed as Proprietorships or in the
form of Corporate Charters. 22  Proprietary
colonies (Maryland (Lord Baltimore) and
Pennsylvania and Delaware (William Penn) at
the time of the Revolution) were those con-
veyed and granted by letters patent from the
King to one or more persons personally, which
patents - in accordance with the feudal prac-
tice - conveyed both rights to the soil and
jurisdiction to govern the territory and the per-
sons therein. 123  Charter governments
(Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut
at the time of the Revolution) were similar to
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the Proprietary colonies in that the soil and
governmental authority were conveyed by
grant, deed, or letter patent, but the soil and
government were conveyed to a body corpo-
rate and politic which would function accord-
ing to the constitution of such body set out in
the charter.12
4
The charters issued to these entities con-
tained several clauses which reflect the basic
assumptions regarding the conjunction of land
tenure, government, and the feudal structure of
their society. First, the grants regularly
reserved unto the King or Prince granting the
property the services due to a feudal lord in the
form of annual rentals payable in money, furs,
or the produce of the lands. 125 It should be
noted, however, that the grant of these lands to
be held "as of our Mannor of East Greenewich,
in free and Common Soccage"' 26 - as well as
the attitudes of the populace - effectively pre-
vented the creation of the feudal tenure system
in the colonies from the original grantee to oth-
ers lower in the chain of title. 12 7 Further, these
grants and charters required the oath of alle-
giance (homage) due the King to be taken
before an authorized officer of the Colony. 128
Many of these grants contained provisions for
the King, upon finding that a subject had
engaged in thief or piracy of the King's sub-
jects or the subjects of some other King or
Prince then in amity with England and had not
made restitution within the time set by the
King, to declare that the subject was out of the
allegiance and protection of the King and that
the aggrieved party then would be entitled to
make war upon the former subject.129
There were regularly two provisions in
these Charters which reinforced the habit and
custom of the English people by which they
brought their common law with them to the
colonies and expected to be treated by their
government according to their rights as English
people. First, as the Charters conveyed the
rights of government to the Proprietary or the
governing corporate body, it did so respecting
the custom of the free inhabitants (generally
meaning the landowners) to elect a body who
would actually pass the laws subject to
Executive approval, as well as the jury trial for
their enforcement, and required that all such
laws be not inconsistent with the laws of
England. 130 Further, these Charters provided
that the colonist and their children were to be
treated as freeborn English subjects to the same
intents and purposes as if they had been born in
England.' 3 1
V. Putting Locks On Our Barkhouses
Crime Comes to the Indian Country
It is impossible for us to suppose these
creatures to be men; because allowing them to
be men, a suspicion would follow that we our-
selves are not Christians.' 32
If our people were astonished at the tech-
nological development of the colonists, it is
also true that the ethical and political develop-
ment of the early colonists were so backward
and barbaric that they could not even recognize
the forms of government in use by the Indian
Tribes with which they came into contact.1 3 3
The European experience, for over a thousand
years prior to our discovery of the lost Genoese
sailor upon our shores, contained no examples
of egalitarian democracy. "Liberty" was
thought of not as freedom from rulers and the
hierarchical feudal power structure,1 34 but
rather as a national liberty from control by
another nation, or the liberty received by a
slave who had advanced to the status of a sub-
ject.' 35 The impact of our political institutions
upon the Europeans post contact was pro-
found, 136 resulting in a rapid diminishment of
the authority generally accepted by the
colonists in their sovereign lord, the King,
137
and eventually leading to their revolution.
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Many of the prominent thinkers and fig-
ures of the colonies during and after their rev-
olution, including Benjamin Franklin, Thomas
Paine, Charles Thomson (the perpetual
Secretary of the Congress), George
Washington, and Thomas Jefferson, were
familiar with Indian political processes.'
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During the revolutionary period, and for some
years thereafter during the period of the
Articles of Confederation, 140 they even
attempted to emulate the League of the Six
Nations (Iroquois) Confederacy with one of
their own. 14 1 However, custom, tradition, and
culture die hard. No matter how much the
Americans had come to detest the King, the
now independent thirteen American colonies
could not make a system of governance work
without the hierarchical power of coercion in
their society. Justice Story described their
inability to operate within a system devoid of
coercion and rank as follows:
It was remarked, by an eminent
statesman, that by this political
compact the Continental Congress
have exclusive power for the following
purposes, without being able to
execute one of them: - They may
make and conclude treaties; but can
only recommend the observance of
them. They may appoint ambassadors;
but they cannot defray even the
expenses of their tables. They may
borrow money in their own name, on
the faith of the Union; but they cannot
pay a dollar. They may coin money;
but they cannot import an ounce of
bullion. They may make war, and
determine what number of troops are
necessary; but they cannot raise a
single soldier. In short, they may
declare every thing, but they can do
nothing. And, strong as this
description may seem, it was literally
true; for Congress had little more than
the power of recommending their
measures to the good will of the States.
The leading defects of the
Confederation were the following: In
the first place , there was an utter want
of all coercive authority in the
Continental Congress to carry into
effect any of their constitutional
measures... there was no power in the
Continental Congress to punish
individuals for any breaches of their
enactments .... 142
These and other "subordinate" defects, accord-
ing to Justice Story, were enough to "establish
its utter unfitness as a frame of government, for
a free, enterprising, and industrious people,"'143
even though similar systems had existed
among many of the eastern Nations of Indians,
including the Iroquois, Cherokee, and Creeks
for hundreds of years.' 44  Simply put, the
Americans had simply not advanced socially
and culturally to the point where they could
make such a system work. They could com-
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mand, but could not consistently lead their peo-
ple. They could obey for fear of punishment,
but could not agreeably abide by the decisions
of their chosen leaders without unwarrantable
dissent. They could enumerate their "rights"
against their superior(s), but could not assume
responsibility to their fellows to act consistent-
ly with the standards of their society. They
could divide into "mine" and "thine", but
would attribute honor and prestige within their
society to the accumulation of wealth and exer-
cise of power, not the uses to which it was
put.145
Regardless of their best theoretical pre-
cepts, and adamant detestation of the British
King and English system of royalty and nobil-
ity, they could not easily throw off the shackles
of class, rank, and privilege, the products of a
thousand years of European custom and tradi-
tion. They have substituted "Mr. President" for
"Your Majesty," and "Senator X" for "Your
Lordship," but review of the records of their
government and news stories of today clearly
show that their leadership expects the defer-
ence "due" their exalted rank. 146 Even their
daily forms of address- Sir, 14 7 Mister, 48
Mistress (Mrs.),149-are based upon the titles
of rank, not the relationship of equals as rela-
tives or families within a society. The theory,
"We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all
men are created equal,"' 150 in practice means
only that all those persons who rank as our
equals and are of the same class are created
equally. Consciously or unconsciously,
Americans tend to classify persons as their
superiors, their equals, or their inferiors - thus
the "upper,". "middle," and "lower" classes of
American society and the atrocious history of
discrimination not only against racial groups,
but against "others" perceived as inferior -
Jews, Irish, and many other later immigrant
groups. 151 Simply stated, those who are differ-
ent are threatening, because in a system inher-
ently rank and power conscious, the "differ-
ent," whether it be, race, culture, or whatsoev-
er, must be suppressed as inferior by those hav-
ing the power to do so lest the different be
found to be superior.
Thus, the short lived experiment of a fed-
eral government without coercive power was
abandoned, less than ten years after it was
instituted, and a federal government was sub-
stituted in its place which is again based on the
power of the executive to compel compliance
with governmental dictates through the use of
force. 152  Like the government under the
Articles of Confederation, 153 and the colonies
before that,' 54 the new federal government was
slow to attempt to extend the reach of its crim-
inal law into the Indian Country. Section 1 of
the Trade and Intercourse Act,' 5 5 drew a
boundary line between the United States and
the Indian Tribes on its frontier according to its
treaty commitments, 156 and provided that if
any Indian crossed said boundary into the
United States and there stole horses or other
property or committed any "murder, violence,
or outrage, upon any such citizen or inhabi-
tant," the United States would apply to the
Tribe for satisfaction if the violator was not
apprehended within American territory. 157 In
1817, Congress extended the criminal law into
the Indian Country subject to the proviso that
such extension did not extend to the commis-
sion of any offence by one Indian against
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another, nor would that extension be construed
as affecting any treaty in force between the
United States and any Tribe. 5 ' These provi-
sions were later continued into sections 2145
and 2146 of the Revised Statutes (with an addi-
tional exception as to those Indians who
already had been punished by the local laws of
their Tribe.)' 15 9
Although Georgia claimed criminal juris-
diction even over Indians in the Indian country
within the boundaries of Georgia, 160 the United
States Supreme Court, in 1832, decided that
state criminal law did not apply within the con-
fines of the Indian Country - even concerning
the conduct of white persons.16 1 Some years
later in a case where Crow Dog killed
American favorite Spotted Tail within their
reservation, both being Indians, the Court held
that the laws of the United States did not
apply.162 This result was followed by the
imposition by Congress of the Major Crimes
Act. 163 In this statute, Congress granted juris-
diction to their federal courts over several
felony offenses (as defined by American law)
committed by Indians in the Indian Country
regardless of the exceptions previously con-
tained in federal law. 164 In the classic anti-
constitutional case of United States v.
Kagama, 165 the Court held that although the
Constitution contained no authority for
Congress to extend the jurisdiction of the
United States over the conduct of Indians with-
in the Indian Country, 166 the statute would be
enforced because:
[t]he power of the general government
over these remnants of a race once
powerful, now weak and diminished in
numbers, is necessary to their
protection, as well as to the safety of
those among whom they dwell. It
must exist in that government, because
it never has existed anywhere else;
because the theater of its exercise is
within the geographical limits of the
United States; because it has never
been denied; and because it alone can
enforce its laws on all the tribes. 1
67
Kagama is patently wrong not only in deciding
that Congress could exercise a power which
was neither conveyed to it by the Constitution
nor necessary and proper for the exercise of
such power, but also in its announcement that
such authority never has existed anywhere
else, 168 and had never been denied.1
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Thus did European-American criminal
law, with all its cultural baggage of rank,
power, and coercive authority over the "sub-
jects," come to the Indian Country. I have pre-
viously mentioned the creation of anglicized
tribal court systems, 170 and will not document
their development here. Suffice it to say that
the "criminal law system" had become so
widespread within the Indian Country that by
1968 Congress felt compelled to adopt the
Indian Civil Rights Act 171 to guarantee certain
of the American's constitutional protections to
tribal members, 172 including many of their
rights in criminal cases. 173 In criminal cases,
at least, the Indian Civil Rights Act requires
that Tribal Courts accord most of the same pro-
cedural protections for defendants that are pro-
vided in federal and state courts. 17 4 The Court
also has determined that both the Tribe and the
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United States may try and convict Indians
within the Indian Country for offenses commit-
ted therein, as they are separate sovereigns and
may independently exercise their authority for
the prevention or punishment of offenses.
175
We are in danger of seeing the "rights" based
mentality of the Americans - a mentality
which is directly attributable to their cultural
and social history described above - replace
our conception of responsibility to our fami-
lies, our clans, our relatives, and our people as
the guiding principle of society.
IV. Sharpened Pencils of Damascus Steel
More Questions Than Answers
They are strangers to
the common law.
They derive their As Indian pe ple, we a
jurisprudence from the Empires of
an entirely different systems of their
source. 176 English commo
Justice Yazzie, 17 7  Enls c
Professor dnc
Pommersheim,178  and
others have begun to describe the analytical
framework and practical application of tribal
court jurisprudence. Issues regarding the "fit"
of tribal courts within thestructure of the soci-
ety of the United States and its Constitutional
system have also been addressed by the feder-
al courts, 179 and, of late, by the academy.1 80
There seems to be a consensus, perhaps unstat-
ed, building amongst the commentators and the
Court that Indian Tribes who expand the reach
of their anglicized political and legal systems,
as they strive for self-governance within our
occupied territories, will run directly into the
Tribe's lack of rank within the hierarchical
power system which is America. There is, per-





Court's decisions in cases such as Ohliphanti8l
and Strate,182 unless one attributes them to
covert or subliminal racism.
Indian Tribes and Indian people will never
give up their right to remain a separate people
and control their own territories and destiny as
a people. 183 As Indian people, we are not heirs
(a feudal word/idea again!) of the Empires of
Europe, nor the feudal systems of their "mid-
dle-ages," nor the English common law with
all its attendant cultural baggage. Neither are
we utopian in outlook or expectation - we
would be the first to say that our societies have
significant problems from both obvious and
non-obvious sources,
re not heirs... of and remedies which are
e, nor the feudal adequate to the prob-
e-ages ", nor the lems are neither obvious
nor readily available
with all its atten- within the context of the
baggage American legal system.
Perhaps, then, we
should hesitate to adopt
the structure and processes of a system which
is not only foreign to the culture and traditions
of Indian peoples, but bedeviled with problems
of its own which are apparently unsolvable
even by those to whom it belongs.
An honest answer to Grandma's question,
then, would be, "I don't know why we adopt a
criminal code as a separate system." There is
no good reason for distinguishing between
wrongs done on the basis of crime and tort
when the structure of our society is such that
our leaders are not political heirs of liege Lords
and Kings who can command obedience from
their subjects. There is no good reason for
such distinction when we do not view wrongs
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and misbehavior as violations of the faith and
allegiance owed a superior, because there are
only relatives with whom we should have good
relations, not superiors to be obeyed and infe-
riors to obey. There is no good reason for this
distinction when wrongful conduct is consid-
ered to be an illness or other personality deficit,
and not an intentional, willful breach of the
laws of God and a man - and particularly
where we do not believe that our job is to act as
executioners for our Creator. It makes no ratio-
nal sense to preclude the victim (and the fami-
lies of the parties) from formal and active par-
ticipation in the process of correcting wrongs
done or obtaining relief for them. It makes no
sense to focus only on controlling the act, and
not to attempt to solve the underlying problem.
It makes no sense to require multiple processes
to address a single wrong. In fine, there is no
good reason for this distinction when the exer-
cise of the coercive power of the criminal jus-
tice system, with its win-lose mentality of
rights instead of responsibilities, is destructive
of the fabric of our societies and without other
redeeming characteristics. The words of
Joseph Brant ring down through two hundred
years of occupation and assimilation:
I was, sir, born of Indian parents, and
lived while a child, among those you
are pleased to call savages; I was
afterwards sent to live among the white
people, and educated at one of your
schools; since which period, I have
been honoured, much beyond my
deserts, by an acquaintance with a
number of principal characters both in
Europe and America. After all this
experience, and after every exertion to
divest myself of prejudice, I am
obliged to give my opinion in favour of
my own people.... I will not enlarge
on an idea so singular in civilized life,
and perhaps disagreeable to you; and
will only observe, that among us, we
have no law but that written on the
heart of every rational creature by the
immediate finger of the great Spirit of
the universe himself. We have no
prisons - we have no pompous
parade of courts; and yet judges are as
highly esteemed among us, as they are
among you, and their decisions as
highly revered; property, to say the
least, is as well guarded, and crimes are
as impartially punished. We have
among us no splendid villains, above
the controul of that law, which
influences our decisions; in a word, we
have no robbery under the colour of
law - daring wickedness here is never
suffered to triumph over helpless
innocence - the estates of widows
and orphans are never devoured by
enterprising sharpers. Our sachems,
and our warriors, eat their own bread,
and not the bread of wretchedness. No
person, among us, desires any other
reward for performing a brave and
worthy action, than the consciousness
of serving his nation. Our wise men
are called fathers - they are truly
deserving the character; they are
always accessible - I will not say to
the meanest of our people - for we
have none mean, but such as render
themselves so by their vices.
The palaces and prisons among
you, form a most dreadful contrast. Go
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to the former places, and you will see,
perhaps, a deformed piece of earth
swelled with pride, and assuming airs,
that become none but the Spirit above.
Go to one of your prisons - here
description utterly fails! - certainly
the sight of an Indian torture, is not half
so painful to a well informed mind.
Kill them [the prisoners], if you please
- kill them, too, by torture; but let the
torture last no longer than a day ....
Those you call savages, relent - the
most furious of our tormentors
exhausts his rage in a few hours, and
dispatches the unhappy victim with a
sudden stroke.
But for what are many of your
prisoners confined? For debt! [For
being Poor!] Astonishing! And will
you ever again call the Indian nations
cruel? - Liberty, to a rational creature,
as much exceeds property, as the light
of the sun does that of the most
twinkling star: but you put them on a
level, to the everlasting disgrace of
civilization . . . . And I seriously
declare, that I had rather die by the
most severe tortures ever inflicted by
any savage nation on the continent,
than languish in one of your prisons for
a single year. Great Maker of the
world! And do you call yourselves
christians? .... Does then the religion
of him whom you call your Saviour,
inspire this conduct, and lead to this
practice? Surely no. It was a sentence
that once struck my mind with some
force, that "a bruised reed he never
broke." Cease then, while these
practices continue among you, to call
yourselves christians, lest you publish
to the world your hypocrisy. Cease to
call other nations savage, when you are
tenfold more the children of cruelty,
than they.18
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Simply stated, it makes no sense to adopt
power, rank, and wealth as the measure of indi-
vidual honor and attainment, and disregard our
traditional standards of fairness, generosity,
humble attitudes, and respectable actions in
life. What then is to be done? In the context of
the criminal justice system, we should rethink
the methodology of social control and rectify-
ing wrongs within our society, searching for
traditionally appropriate methods of response
which are workable in today's environment.
We, as Tribal Attorneys, must look to the
past to see where five hundred years of occu-
pation has brought destruction and decay,
while helping to design and construct Indian
people's vision for their future. 185 We need not
fear this vision quest. Work in this arena has
already commenced, with such works as
Professors Gloria Valencia-Weber18 6 and
Christine Zuni's work on Indian women in
Tribal societies,1 87 as well as the works of Alex
Tallchief Skibine,' 88 Robert Porter,18 9 Richard
Monette, 190  Justice Yazzie, Professor
Pommersheim, and others. 19 1 Generally, we
must pursue basic and fundamental questions
regarding the very nature of American society
as it has been foisted upon Indian people, and
refuse to accept that which is fundamentally
adverse to our culture and society, instead
rebuilding those institutions and processes by
which the Creator made each of our Tribes
unique as a people.
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If the hypotheses considered in these mus-
ings have a glimmer of validity, it may be pos-
sible to explain the cyclical and schizophrenic
nature of federal Indian policy in alternatively
providing support for self-government by
Indian Nations and then (when Indian Nations
do begin to achieve governmental and eco-
nomic successes) demanding that Indians indi-
vidually assimilate into the American main-
stream, all the while refusing admittance there-
in at any level above that of the lowliest villain
to Indians,192 other people of color, and others
seen as "inferiors," in terms of the feudal cul-
tural traditions of American society.193 It may,
perhaps, be possible to thereby explain the
American tendency to decry genocide and
demand self-governance for peoples in other
places in the world whilst at the same time
denying true self-governance in the
Marshallian sense 194 to Indian Tribes, and
forging federal Indian policies which are geno-
cidal in nature.1 95 I also suspect that further
research in this arena may provide a paradigm
for the explanation of other aspects of
American culture and tradition (that which
they call law) rooted in the hierarchical feudal
system, not only as it applies to Indians, but
also as it applies to the very nature of Anglo-
American jurisprudential thought. Prime can-
didates for future research in this area seem to
include fields such as criminal law, property 196
juvenile law, and other areas which delve
deeply into concepts regarding governmental
structures, social control methodologies, and
dispute resolution systems. In short, while
Americans have learned many of the concepts
of individual liberty and democratic principals
inherent in the nature of egalitarian Indian
societies, they have failed to fully "lay to heart
another's wisdom" and in their continuing
destructive interference with Indian society are
destroying an important well of wisdom from
which they might draw much sustaining
strength, and an alternative view of society,
social processes, and human kind's place on
this earth.
As a single example, American politicians
claim to be "servants of the people." Yet,
which Governor, Mayor, or Alderman is
expected to take a shovel and dig the grave of
their constituents who pass away? Which leg-
islator would expect to be called upon to cut
wood or cook? Which Attorney General or
District Attorney is expected to build fire upon
which to cook? Which Justice or Judge
expects to be called upon to wait tables and
serve the family and friends of the deceased?
And which of them would expect to be placed
under the charge of the janitor from the head-
start who will be in overall charge of the funer-
al? Yet even in Tribes larger than most rural
towns, such expectations are routine regarding
many events of importance to the community
and its people. Clearly a significant difference
exists in the Indian and non-Indian communi-
ties with regard to the expectations of the peo-
ple and leaders relative to political leadership.
These differences, and the expectations and
assumptions underlying them, have not been
adequately explained. I propose that it is criti-
cal to understand these differences, and the
fundamental societal cultures, traditions, and
assumptions which give rise to them, if the
avowed American dream of creating a class-
less, color-blind society - of the people, by
the people, for the people - is to have any
hope of success. It is imperative, then, that
strong, traditional, Indian Tribal governments
not only exist, but flourish within the United
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States as autonomous entities if the United
States is to fulfill the goals its forefathers
expressed only two hundred years ago.
As Tribal Attorneys, then, we must protect
and, where necessary, begin the process of
recovering, our own tribal identities, govern-
mental structures, social control methodolo-
gies, and dispute resolution systems. We must
teach the non-Indian world the underlying
rationale for our methodology in terms they
can understand, while always being cognizant
that they will, perhaps, eventually learn some-
thing - even as their founding fathers did.
Most of all, when called upon to assist in the
development of modem tribal government and-
its policies, we must hesitate to act like lawyers
and instead listen to the people who sing the
songs of tens of thousands of years of freedom.
Only then can we use the skills we learned in
law school as true architects and advocates of
Tribal Sovereignty. These are the challenges
those of us who are almost done must leave for
those who are just beginning. Stand up. There
is much to be done.
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lord or master, and an ecclesiastic to his lord or religious
superior. Both were felony. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
IV COMMENrAIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 75 (1769).
84. See id. at 304.
85. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, I THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 47 (1899).
86. See generally, id. at 46-51, 476-78.
87. The "crime-tort" law of early England is explained
in Chapter 8 of POLLOCK & MAITLAND, II THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW (1899).
88. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, II THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 449 (1899).
89. See David J. Seipp, Symposium: The Distinction
Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law, 76 B.
U. L. REV. 59, 60 (1996). The Writ of Trespass against
the King's peace became the tort action. Victims general-
ly used it for receiving compensation, although the King
imposed a fine upon conviction pursuant to such Writs for
the breach of his peace. The Indictment of Trespass
became, in effect, the misdemeanor.
90. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, IV COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 308 (1769).
91. The writ of trespass was an action for compensatory
damages in the King's courts. It could be brought instead
of the Appeal of Felony for felonies other than homicide,
but could also be brought for offenses which did not arise
to the level of felony. The form of the Writ was that the
defendant had caused damages to the victim "with force
and arms against the king's peace." The courts treated
these "violations of the king's peace" seriously, and could
arrest or outlaw (as they did in criminal cases) defendants
who failed to appear in response to the writ. Seipp, supra
note 89, at 69-70. Montesquieu reports a case in France
where a Judge demanded satisfaction (a legal duel) when
his order to appear was not obeyed. "I sent for thee, and
thou didst not think it worth thy while to come; I demand
therefore satisfaction for this contempt." MONTESQUIEU,
supra note 82, at 235.
92. Only the Appellant could discharge an appeal of
felony. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, IV COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAW OF ENGLAND 311-12 (1769).
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93. See id.
94. Montesquieu described the rules of judicial combat
as follows:
When there happened to be several accusers,
they were obliged to agree among themselves
that the action might be carried on by a single
prosecutor; and if they could not agree, the
person before whom the action was brought
appointed one of them to prosecute the quarrel.
When a gentleman challenged a villain
[villein] he was obliged to present himself on
foot with buckler and baton, but if he came on
horseback, and armed like a gentleman, they
took his horse and his arms from him; and
stripping him to his shirt, they obliged him to
fight in that condition with the villain.
Before the combat the magistrates
ordered three banns to be published. By the
first the relations of the parties were
commanded to retire; by the second the people
were warned to be silent; and the third
prohibited the giving any assistance to either of
the parties, under severe penalties; nay, even on
pain of death, if by this assistance one of the
combatants should happen to be vanquished.
The officer belonging to the civil
magistrate guarded the list or inclosure where the
battle was fought; and in case either of the
parties declared himself desirous of peace, they
took particular notice of the actual state in which
things stood at that very moment, to the end that
they might be restored to the same situation in
case they did not come to an accommodation.
When the pledges were received either for
a crime or for false judgment, the parties could
not make up the matter without the consent of
the lord; and when one of the parties was
overcome, there could be no accommodation
without the permission of the count, which had
some analogy to our letters of grace.
MoNTESQui, supra note 82, at 241-42.
95. On the other hand, the victim would generally be
willing to accept a lesser amount in settlement of the
appeal of felony than they might if proceeding pursuant
to a writ of trespass, since if the appeal of felony went to
trial and the defendant was convicted and sentenced, the
victim got nothing. See David D. Friedman, Making
Sense of English Law Enforcement in the Eighteenth
Century, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 475, 486-92
(1995). Thus there was great pressure upon the perpetra-
tor (and his family) not to appear "judgment proof," and
pressure upon both victim and perpetrator to reach an
amicable settlement.
96. See Seipp, supra note 89, at 72-76.
97. See id. Some effects of these rules would seem
strange to American society today. Not only were the
defendant's goods forfeited by the verdict, thus removing
any possibility of the victim receiving compensation even
if the defendant was later pardoned, but so was the vic-
tim's stolen property, and the object used to commit the
offense. In today's terms, if a man robbed a bank, stole a
getaway car, and ran over a pedestrian during the get-
away, the bank's money, the car, and all the perpetrator's
worldly goods were forfeited to the King. The perpetra-
tor's land was in the King's hands for a year and a day,
and was then forfeited to the Lord of the fief. Neither the
bank nor the car owner obtained a return of their stolen
property, and the perpetrator had no property left from
which the pedestrian could obtain compensation for
injuries. See id.
98. See id. These penalties - execution and forfeiture
of goods and lands along with corruption of the blood -
were common to most felonious offenses. See COKE,
supra note 78, at L.3, C.13, § 745. Forfeiture of goods
occurred upon a finding of a guilty verdict, forfeiture of
lands and corruption of the blood occurred only upon
entry of the judgement and sentence. See id.
99. See Friedman, supra note 95, at 495-97. Although
the felon's goods, and one year's rent from the convicted
felon's lands belonged to the King upon conviction and
entry of judgment and sentence, a larger amount might be
paid by the felon or his friends and family in order to
secure a pardon thereby saving his life and, perhaps,
recovering the family's lands. See Seipp, supra note 89,
at 73. Pardons also had political value in that the perpe-
trator and their family "owed" both the King who granted
the pardon and the liege Lord who interceded on their
behalf, and in many cases surely felt a true sense of life-
long obligation for the assistance rendered and the pardon
given.
100. See Friedman, supra note 95, at 505. This is the
origin of the offense of compounding a crime. Obviously,
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if the victim to a "crime" could prevent its prosecution,
the Crown and Lords of the realm lost revenues in that
they lost the ability to obtain the escheat of goods and
forfeiture of lands to which they would be entitled upon
conviction and sentencing, respectively. See COKE, supra
note 78, at L.3, C.13, § 745. Certainly the King and
members of the House of Lords would have had no ani-
mosity toward preventing a diminution of revenues to
which they felt themselves entitled.
101. See id.; see also Seipp, supra note 89, at 73; and
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, IV COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
Or ENGLAND 308-12 (1769).
102. For an in depth look at a 201h Century return of a
form of victim compensation incorporated into the crimi-
nal process, see Alan T. Harland, Monetary Remedies for
the Victims of Crime: Assessing the Role of the Criminal
Courts, 30 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 52 (1982). Of course, con-
cepts such as that of punitive damages in tort actions also
are a form of punishment incorporated into "civil" cases.
103.
The impact of Martin Luther's concept of
the individual and his power achieved by
allowing God's grace to work through his own
conscience, cannot be overemphasized. That
concept denied the rationale of the Roman
Catholic Church for monopolizing the legal
power structure and tying secular law to
theological doctrine. Think of this bit of Teutonic
efficiency in contemporary terms: Why pay the
Vatican cable company to view God's will when
each individual can receive it direct from God
Himself by tuning in his own conscience?
Religion aside, monarchs liked Luther's
concept because it gave them a reason to dispute
the power of the Church and freed them to create
positivist laws. Common wisdom appears to be
that rulers and their laws suddenly had no moral
restraints; however, this is not the case. Law did
become secular and positive. However, the laws
presupposed a respect for the individual
conscience, contracts, and property rights. This
presupposition incorporated four centuries of
Roman Catholic teachings, which served as the
moral compass guiding both individual and ruler
as they sanctified and spiritualized agreements
under amoral positive law. To break one's word
wasn't just to break it with one's fellow human,
it was to break it with God and risk eternal
damnation."
Dan Gifford, The Conceptual Foundations of Anglo-
American Jurisprudence in Religion and Reason, 62
TENN. L. REv. 759, 807 (1995); see also WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, IV COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
ENGLAND 102-118 (1769).
104. See Gifford, supra note 103, at 808.
105. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, IV COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAW OF ENGLAND 102-118 (1769) defining the crimi-
nal offense of Praemunire, the introducing of a foreign
power (the Pope) into England in derogation of the
authority of the King. See id. at 114.
106.
Government by kings was first introduced into
the world by the Heathens, from whom the
children of Israel copied the custom. It was the
most prosperous invention the Devil ever set on
foot for the promotion of idolatry. The Heathens
paid divine honors to their deceased kings, and
the Christian world hath improved on the plan by
doing the same to their living ones.
THOMAS PAYNE, COMMON SENSE (n.p. 1776).
107. Perhaps no British monarch after the Conqueror
claimed divine status, although certain political theories
certainly claimed (as did Hammurabi and the Caesars)
that they ruled by divine right. Even the clerics were
required to acknowledge the supremacy of the King over
the Church. See CHRISTIE & MARTIN, JURISPRUDENCE 392
(1995).
108.
The grand and fundamental maxim of all feodal
tenure is this; that all lands were originally
granted out by the sovereign, and are therefore
holden, either mediately or immediately, of the
crown. The grantor was called the proprietor, or
lord; being he who retained the dominion or
ultimate property of the feud or fee: and the
grantee, who had only the use and possession,
according to the terms of the grant, was stiled the
feudatory or vasal ....
Besides an oath of fealty, or profession of
faith to the lord, which was the parent of our oath
of allegiance, the vasal or tenant upon investiture
did usually homage to his lord; openly and
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humbly kneeling, being ungirt, uncovered, and
holding up his hands together between those of
the lord, who sate [sic] before him; and there
professing that "he did become his man, from "
[sic] that day forth, of life and limb and earthly
honour:" and then he received a kiss from his
lord. Which ceremony was denominated
homagium, or manhood, by the feudists, from
the stated form of words, devenio vester homo.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 11 COMMENTARmS ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 53, 54 (1769).
109. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAw OF ENGLAND 151-53 (1769).
110.
The majority of the peasants are villains, and the
legal conception of villainage has its roots not in
the connexion of the villain with the soil, but in
his personal dependence on the lord.
As to the general aspect of villainage in the legal
theory of English feudalism there can be no
doubt. The 'Dialogus de Scaccario' gives it in a
few words: the lords are owners not only of the
chattels but of the bodies of their ascripticii, they
may transfer them wherever they please, 'and
sell or otherwise alienate them if they like.'
Glanville and Bracton, Fleta and Britton follow
in substance the same doctrine, although they
use different terms. They appropriate the Roman
view that there is no difference of quality
between serfs and serfs: all are in the same abject
state. Legal theory keeps a very firm grasp of the
distinction between status and tenure, between a
villain and a free man holding in villainage, but
it does not admit of any distinction of status
among serfs: servus, villanus, and nativus are
equivalent terms as to personal condition,
although this last is primarily meant to indicate
something else besides condition, namely, the
fact that a person has come to it by birth. The
close connexion between the terms is well
illustrated by the early use of nativa, nieve, 'as a
feminine to villanus.'
These notions are by no means abstractions
bereft of practical import. Quite in keeping with
them, manorial lords could remove peasants
from their holdings at their will and pleasure. An
appeal to the courts was of no avail: the lord in
reply had only to oppose his right over the
plaintiff's person, and to refuse to go into the
subject-matter of the case. Nor could the villain
have any help as to the amount and the nature of
his services; the King's Courts will not examine
any complaint in this respect, and may
sometimes go so far as to explain that it is no
business of theirs to interfere between the lord
and his man. In fact any attempt on the part of
the dependant to assert civil rights as to his
master will be met and defeated by the 'exceptio
villenagii.' The state refuses to regulate the
position of this class on the land, and therefore
there can be no question about any legal
'ascription' to the soil. Even as to his person, the
villain was liable to be punished and put into
prison by the lord, if the punishment inflicted did
not amount to loss of life or injury to his body.
The extant Plea Rolls and other judicial records
are full of allusions to all these rights of the lord
and disabilities of the villain, and it must be
taken into account that only an infinitely small
part of the actual cases can have left any trace in
such records, as it was almost hopeless to bring
them to the notice of the Royal Courts.
PAUL VINOGRADOFF, VILLAINAGE IN ENGLAND: ESSAYS IN
ENGLISH MEDIAEVAL HISTORY I (1892).
111.
Liberty itself has appeared insupportable to
those nations who have not been accustomed to
enjoy it. Thus a pure air is sometimes
disagreeable to those who have lived in a fenny
country.
Balbi, a Venetian, being a Pegu, was
introduced to the king. When the monarch was
informed that they had no king at Venice, he
burst into such a fit of laughter, that he was
scarce-able to speak to his courtiers. What
legislator could propose a popular government to
a people like this?
BARON DE MONTESQUtEU, I THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 362
(1751).
112. One author has suggested that the development of
the distinction between the civil and criminal law can be
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attributed to the choice of remedies made available to the
victim through the various processes of the King's courts.
See Seipp, supra note 89, at 83.
113. See CESARE LOMBROSO, CRIME: ITS CAUSES AND
REMEDIEs 449 (Henry P. Horton trans, 1911).
114. See, e.g., WILIAM BLACKSTONE, IV COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND Chapters IV and VIII (1761).
115. See id. at 137-38.
116. See id at 137-38 (perjury and subordination of per-
jury), 363-67 (as condition of pleading the benefit of cler-
gy for most felonies including petite treason), 370 (as
specified penalty for certain statutory offenses), 394 (con-
dition of pardons).
117. MR. JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSmON
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 13-14
(1840).
Brothers; - We never made any agreement with
the King, nor with any other Nation that we
would give to either the exclusive right of
purchasing our lands. And we declare to you
that we consider ourselves free to make any
bargain or cession of lands, whenever & to
whomsoever we please, if the white people as
you say, made a treaty that none of them but the
King should purchase of us, and that he has
given that right to the United States, it is an affair
which concerns you & him & not us. We have
never parted with such a power..
2 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF LIEUT. GOVERNOR JOHN
GRAVES SIMCOE 17-19, (E.A. Cruitshark, ed., 5 vols.,
Toronto Ontario Historical Society, 1923-31), reprinted in
THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN - INDIAN VOICES FROM
EARLY AMERICA 182 (Colin G. Galloway, ed., 1994).
118. See Seipp, supra note 89.
119. Blackstone took the position that most of England's
American colonies were not subject to English custom
and tradition:
[lI]f an uninhabited country be discovered
and planted by English subjects, all the English
laws are immediately there in force. For as the
law is the birthright of every subject, so
wherever they go they carry their laws with
them.. But in conquered or ceded countries, that
have already laws of their own, the king may
indeed alter and change those laws; but, till he
does actually change them, the antient laws of
the country remain, unless such as are against the
law of God, as in the case of an infidel country.
Our American plantations are principally
of this latter sort, being obtained in the last
century either by right of conquest and driving
out the natives (with what natural justice I shall
not at present enquire) or by treaties. And
therefore the common law of England, as such,
has no allowance or authority there;...
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 104-05 (1769) Mr. Justice Story articulated a
contrary view:
There is great reason to doubt the accuracy
of this [Blackstone's] statement in a legal view.
We have already seen that the European nations,
by whom America was colonized, treated the
subject in a very different manner. They claimed
an absolute dominion over the whole territories
afterwards occupied by them, not in virtue of any
conquest of, or cession by the Indian natives; but
as a right acquired by discovery. Some of them,
indeed, obtained a sort of confirmatory grant
from the papal authority. - But as between
themselves they treated the dominion and title of
territory as resulting from priority of discovery;
and the European power, which had first
discovered the country, and set up mark of
possession, was deemed to have gained the right,
though it had not yet formed a regular colony
there. We have also seen, that the title of the
Indians was not treated as a right of propriety
and dominion; but as a mere right of occupancy.
As infidels, heathens, and savages, they were not
allowed to possess the perogatives belonging to
absolute, sovereign and independent nations.
The territory, over which they wandered, and
which they used for their temporary and fugitive
purposes, was, in respect to Christians, deemed
as if it were inhabited only by brute animals.
There is not a single grant from the British crown
from the earliest grant of Elizabeth down to the
latest of George the Second, that affects to look
to any title, except that founded on discovery.
Conquest or cession is not once alluded to. And
it is impossible, that it should have been any
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conquest of cession from the natives of the
territory comprehended in those grants. Even in
respect to the territory of New-York and New-
Jersey, which alone afford any pretence for a
claim by conquest, they were conquered from
the Dutch, and not from the natives; and were
ceded to England by the treaty of Breda in 1667.
But England claimed this very territory, not by
right of this conquest, but by the prior right of
discovery. The original grant was made to the
Duke of York in 1664, founded upon this right,
and the subsequent confirmation of his title did
not depart from the original foundation.
§ 153. The Indians could in no just sense
be deemed a conquered people, who had been
stripped of their territorial possessions by
superior force. They were considered as a
people, not having any regular laws, or any
organized government; but as mere wandering
tribes. They were never reduced into actual
obedience, as dependent communities; and no
scheme of general legislation over them was
ever attempted.
MR. JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY, I COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 135- 36 (1833).
This was the view which was taken, almost "tongue-in-
cheek," by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 543-44 (1832):
After lying concealed for a series of ages,
the enterprise of Europe, guided by nautical
science, conducted some of her adventurous
sons into this western world. They found it in
possession of a people who had made small
progress in agriculture or manufactures, and
whose general employment was war, hunting,
and fishing. Did these adventurers, by sailing
along the coast, and occasionally landing on it,
acquire for the several governments to whom
they belonged, or by whom they were
commissioned, a rightful property in the soil,
from the Atlantic to the Pacific; or rightful
dominion over the numerous people who
occupied it? Or has nature, or the great Creator
of all thigs, conferred these rights over hunters
and fishermen, on agriculturists and
manufacturers? But power, war, conquest, give
rights, which, after possession, are conceded by
the world; and which can never be controverted
by those on whom they descend. We proceed,
then, to the actual state of things, having glanced
at their origin; because holding it in our
recollection might shed some light on existing
pretensions.
The great maritime powers of Europe
discovered and visited different parts of this
continent at nearly the same time. The object
was too immense for any one of them to grasp
the whole; and the claimants were too powerful
to submit to the exclusive or unreasonable
pretensions of any single potentate. To avoid
bloody conflicts, which might terminate
disastrously to all, it was necessary for the
nations of Europe to establish some principle
which all would acknowledge, and which should
decide their respective rights as between
themselves. This principle, suggested by the
actual state of things, was, 'that discovery gave
title to the government by whose subjects or by
whose authority it was made, against all other
European governments, which title might be
consummated by possession.' 8 Wheat. 573.
This principle, acknowledged by all Europeans,
because it was the interest of all to acknowledge it, gave
to the nation making the discovery, as its inevitable con-
sequence, the sole right of acquiring the soil and of mak-
ing settlements on it. It was an exclusive principle which
shut out the right of competition among those who had
agreed to it; not one which could annul the previous
rights of those who had not agreed to it. It regulated the
right given by discovery among the European discover-
ers; but could not affect the rights of those already in pos-
session, either as aboriginal occupants, or as occupants by
virtue of a discovery made before the memory of man. It
gave the exclusive right to purchase, but did not found
that right on denial of the right of the possessor to sell.
120. For a more thorough exposition of the development
of the Colonies prior to the Revolutionary War, see
STORY, supra note 119, at 3 -13 1.
121. See STORY, supra note 117, at 17.
122. See idat 17-18.
123. See id. at 18.
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124. See id at 18-19.
125.
TO BEE HOLDEN of us, our heires and
Successors, as of our Mannor of East
Greenewich, in Free and Common Soccage, and
not in Capite nor by Knights Service,
YIELDING AND PAYINGE therefore to us, our
heires and Successors, onely the Fifth parte of all
the Oare of Gold and Silver which from tyme to
tyme and at all tymes hereafter shall bee there
gotten, had or obteyned, in liew of all Services,
Dutyes and Demaunds whatsoever, to bee to vs,
our heires or Successors, therefore or thereout
rendered, made or paid.
CONNECTICUT COLONY CHARTE.R OF 1662; <http://
www.law.uoknor.edu/hist/colony.html>
[Y]eilding therefore yerelie to us, our heires and
successors, the fifte parte onelie of all the same
goulde and silver and die fifteenth parte of all the
same copper soe to be gotten or had, as is
aforesaid, and without anie other manner of
profitt or accompte to be given or yeilded to us,
our heires or successors, for or in respecte of the
same.
THE FIsR VIRGMA CHARTER (APRIL 10, 1606); <http://
odur.let.rug.nl/-usa/D/I 601-1650/virginia/chart0l .html>.
Now these presents witness, that for and in
consideration of a competent sum of lawful
English money, unto his said Royal Highness in
hand paid, and for the better extinguishing all
such claims, and demands, as his said Royal
Highness may any ways have of or in the
premises aforesaid, now called West New Jersey,
or any part of them; and for the further and better
settling, conveying, assuring, and confirming of
the same and of every part thereof, according to
the purport and true meaning of these presents,
his said Royal Highness, the said James Duke of
York, hath granted, bargained, sold, and
confirmed, and by these presents, doth grant,
bargain, sell, and confirm unto the said William
Penn, Gawen Lawry, Nicholas Lucas, John
Eldridge, and Edmund Warner .... and of their
heirs and assigns forever; in trust nevertheless
for the said Edward Byllynge, his heirs and
assigns forever. Yielding and paying therefore
yearly for the said whole entire premises, unto
his Royal Highness, his heirs and assigns, the
yearly rent of ten nobles of lawful English
money, at or in the Middle Temple Hall London,
at or upon the feast day of St. Michael the Arch
Angel.
Grant of New Jersey (1680) <http://www.state.nj.us./
njfacts/njdoc8.htm>.
[t]o be holden of us, our heirs and successors, as
of the Manor of East Greenwich, in our county
of Kent, in free and common soccage,and not in
capite, nor by knight service; yielding and
paying therefor, to us, our heirs and successors,
only the fifth part of all the ore or gold and silver
which, from time to time, and at all times
hereafter, shall be there gotten, had or obtained,
in lieu and satisfaction of all services, duties,
fines, forfeitures, made or to be made, claims
and demands whatsoever, to be to us, our heirs or
successors, therefor or thereout rendered, made
or paid .. "
CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND (1663). The price
for Maryland was reported to be two Indian
arrows annually. See STORY, supra note 119, at
92.
126. CONNECTICUT COLONY CHARTER, supra note 125.
127. Mr. Justice Story reports that:
In all the colonies, the lands within their limits
were by the very terms of their original grants
and charters to be holden of the crown in free
and common soccage, and not in capite or by
knights service. They were all holden either, as
of the manor of East Greenwich in Kent, or of
the manor of Hampton Court in Middlesex, or of
the castle of Windsor in Berkshire. All the
slavish and military part of the ancient feudal
tenures were thus effectually prevented from
taking root in the American soil; and the
colonists escaped from the oppressive burdens,
which for a longtime affected the parent country,
and were not abolished until after the restoration
of Charles the Second. Our tenures thus
acquired a universal simplicity; and it is
believed, that none but freehold tenures in
soccage ever were in use among us. No traces
are to be found of copy hold, or gavel kind, or
burgage tenures. In short, for most purposes, our
lands may be deemed to be perfectly allodial, or
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held of no superior at all; though many of the
distinctions of the feudal law have necessarily
insinuated themselves into the modes of
acquiring, transferring, and transmitting real
estates. One of the most remarkable
circumstances in our colonial history is the
almost total absence of leasehold estates. The
erection of manors with all their attendant
privileges, was, indeed, provided for in several
of the charters. But it was so little congenial with
the feelings, the wants, or the interests of the
people, that after their erection they gradually
fell into desuetude; and the few remaining in our
day are but shadows of the past, the relics of
faded grandeur in the last steps of decay,
enjoying no privileges, and conferring no power.
STORY, supra note 119, at 160.
128. [The Governor shall] have full Power and
Authoritie to minister and give the Oathe and Oathes of
Supremacie and Allegiance, or either of them, to all and
everie Person and Persons, which shall at any Tyme or
Tymes hereafter goe or passe to the Landes and Premisses
hereby mentioned to be grauntcd to inhabite in the same."
CHARTER OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY, <htttp://odur.letrug.nl/
-usa/D/1601-1650/massachusetts/mchart.hln>.
"[Governor] to have power and authority to Administer
the Oath of Supremacy and obedience to all and every
Person and Persons which shall att any tyme or tymes
hereafter goe or passe into the said Colony of
Connecticutt." CONNECTICUT COLONY CHARTER, supra
note 125.
129. ". . . IT]hen it shalbe lawfull to us, our heires and
successors to put the saide parson or parsons having com-
mitted such robberie or spoile and theire procurers, abbet-
tors or comfortors out of our allegeannce and protection..
. ."' THE FIRST VIRGINIA CHARTER, supra note 125. "...
[I]f the said person or persons who shall commit any such
robbery or spoil shall not make satisfaction, accordingly,
within such time, so to be limited, that then we, our heirs
and successors, will put such person or persons, out of
our allegiance and protection .. " CHARTER OF RHODE
ISLAND, supra note 125.
130.
.[To Erect and make such Judicatories for
the heareing and Determining of all Accons,
Causes, matters and things happening within the
said Colony or Plantacon and which shall bee in
dispute and depending there, as they shall thinke
fitt and convenient, And alsoe from tyme to
tyme to Make, Ordaine and Establish All manner
of wholesome and reasonable Lawes, Statutes,
Ordinances, Direccons and Instruccons, not
contrary to the laws of this Realme of England..
CONNECTICUT COLONY CHARTER, supra note 125.
. . .[T]o order, direct and authorize the imposing
of lawful and reasonable fines, mulcts,
imprisonments, and executing other
punishments, pecuniary and corporal, upon
offenders and delinquents, according to the
course of other corporations within this our
kingdom of England; and again to alter, revoke,
annul or pardon, under their common seal, or
otherwise, such fines, mulcts, imprisonments,
sentences, judgments and condemnations, as
shall be thought fit; and to direct, rule, order and
dispose of, all other matters and things, and
particularly that which relates to the making of
purchases of the native Indians, as to them shall
seem meet. ...
CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND, supra note 125. See also
THE FIRST VIRGINIA CHARTER, supra note 125. (This
Charter required the King's personal approval of all legis-
lation.); CHARTER OF MASSACHUSETrS BAY, supra note
128.
131.
.. . [W]e do, for us, our heirs and successors,
ordain, declare, and grant unto the said Governor
and Company, and their successors, that all and
every the subjects of us, our heirs and
successors, which are already planted and settled
within our said Colony of Providence
Plantations, or which shall hereafter go to inhabit
within the said Colony, and all and every of their
children, which have been born there, or which
shall happen hereafter to be born there, or on the
sea, going thither, or returning from thence, shall
have and enjoy all liberties and immunities of
free and natural subjects within any of the
dominions of us, our heirs and successors, to all
intents, constructions and purposes, whatsoever,
as if they, and every of them, were born within
the realm of England....
CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND, supra note 129. See also
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THE FIRST VIRGINIA CHARTER, supra note 125;
CONNECTICUT COLONY CHARTER, supra note 130. For
further information in this regard, see Story, supra note
117, at 20-22.
132. See BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, I THE SPIRIT OF THE
LAws, 295 Printed for G. and A. Ewing, in Dame-street,
and G. Faulkner in Essex-street (1751), reprinted in The
Legal Classics Library, 1984.
133. "For the savage people in many places of America,
except the government of small families, the concord
whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no government at
all, and live at this day in that brutish manner, as I said
before." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, Part I, Chapter 13
(n.p. 1651).
134.
The subjection of them who institute a
commonwealth amongst themselves, is no less
absolute, than the subjection of servants. And
therein they are in equal estate; but the hope of
those is greater than the hope of these. For he
that subject[s] himself uncompelled, think[s]
there is reason he should be better used, than he
that doth it upon compulsion; and coming in
freely, call[s] himself, though in subjection, a
FREEMAN; whereby it appear[s], that liberty is
not any exemption from subjection and
obedience to the sovereign power, but a state of
better hope than theirs, that have been subjected
by force and conquest. And this was the reason,
that the name that signiflies] children, in the
Latin tongue is liberi, which also signitlies]
freemen. And yet in Rome, nothing at that time
was so obnoxious to the power of others, as
children in the family of their fathers. For both
the state had power over their life without
consent of their fathers; and the father might kill
his son by his own authority, without any
warrant from the state. Freedom therefore in
commonwealths is nothing but the honor of
equality of favor with other subjects, and
servitude the estate of the rest. A freeman
therefore may expect employments of honor,
rather than a servant. And this is all that can be
understood by the liberty of the subject.
THOMAS HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW NATURAL AND
POLITIC, Part i, Chapter 23 (n.p. 1640); See also JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, HARVARD CLASSICS VOL. 25
(1909).
135. See JACK WEATHERFORD, INDIAN GIVERS 117-31
(1988).
136. See id.
And if Josephus Acosta s word may be taken, he
tells us, that in many parts of America there was
no government at all. There are great and
apparent conjectures, says he, that these men,
speaking of those of Peru, for a long time had
neither kings nor commonwealths, but lived in
troops, as they do this day in Florida, the
Cheriquanas [Cherokees], those of Brazil, and
many other nations, which have no certain kings,
but as occasion is offered, in peace or war, they
choose their captains as they please, 1. I. c. 25.
If it be said, that every man there was born
subject to his father, or the head of his family;
that the subjection due from a child to a father
took not away his freedom of uniting into what
political society he thought fit, has been already
proved. But be that as it will, these men, it is
evident, were actually free; and whatever
superiority some politicians now would place in
any of them, they themselves claimed it not, but
by consent were all equal, till by the same
consent they set rulers over themselves. So that
their politic societies all began tiom a voluntary
union, and the mutual agreement of men freely
acting in the choice of their governors, and forms
of government
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TR.ATISE OF GOVERNMENT 242
(1698). The setting of "rulers over themselves" referred
to by Locke was the temporary acquiescence in leader-
ship on a particular hunt or during a particular war. See
id. at 248.
137.
THE natural liberty of man is to be free
from any superior power on earth, and not to be
under the will or legislative authority of man, but
to have only the law of nature for his rule. The
liberty of man, in society, is to be under no other
legislative power, but that established, by
consent, in the commonwealth; nor under the
dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but
what that legislative shall enact, according to the
trust put in it. Freedom then is not what Sir
Cold Steel
Robert Filmer tells us, O.A. 55. a liberty for
every one to do what he lists, to live as he
pleases, and not to be tied by any laws: but
freedom of men under government is, to have a
standing rule to live by, common to every one of
that society, and made by the legislative power
erected I it; a liberty to follow my own will in all
things, where the rule prescribes not; and not to
be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown,
arbitrary will of another man: as freedom of
nature is, to be under no other restraint but the
law of nature.
Id. at 182. See also PAYNE, supra note 106.
138. See, e.g., DECLARATION OF THE CAUSES AND
NECESSITY OF TAKING UP ARMs, July 6, 1775, I JOURNAL
OF CONGRESS, pp 134-39 (edited 1800). See also THE
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
October 14, 1774: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE,
reprinted in the appendix of STORY, supra note 117, at
271-79.
139. See WEATHEIORD, supra note 135, at 142-43. It
has been suggested that the first call for unity of the
colonies actually came from the Tribes. Addressing the
Governors of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland in
1744, the Tribes said in part:
We have one Thing further to say, and that is, We
heartily recommend Union and a good
Agreement between you our Brethren. Never
disagree, but preserve a strict Friendship for one
another, and thereby you, as well as we, will
become the stronger. Our wise Forefathers
established Union and Amity between the Five
Nations; this has made us formidable; this has
given us great Weight and Authority with our
neighbouring Nations. We are a powerful
Confederacy; and, by your observing the same
Methods our wise Forefathers have taken, you
will acquire fresh Strength and Power; therefore
whatever befalls you, never fall out one with
another."
Speech of Canasatego at the Treaty of Lancaster (July 4,
1744), 4 PENNSYLVANIA COLONIAL RECORDS 698-734
reprinted in THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DowN - INDIAN
VOICES FROM EARLY AMERICA 101 (Colin G. Galloway
ed., 1994).
140. Proposed in 1777, finally agreed to by the last
Colony/State (Maryland) in 1781 and thereafter effective
until the adoption of the Constitution of the United States
and its implementation. See STORY, supra note 117, at 28.
141. See id. at 133-50. For further information on the
confederacy of the Six Nations - which served to govern
most of what is now New England for hundreds of years
and is still in active use today among the Houdenosaunee-
see ARTHUR C. PARKER, PARKER ON THE IROQUOIS (1968).
For the Articles of Confederation (the "firm league of
friendship" of the colonies) see STORY, supra note 117, at
279.
142. STORY, supra note 117, at 29-30.
143. Id. at 32.
144. See WEATHERFORD, supra note 135, at 133-50; see
also SHARON O'BRIEN, TRIBAL GOvERENT (1989);
PARKER, supra note 141.
145. Benjamin Franklin went so far as to propose that the
Executive of the United States, like those with which he
was familiar from the Six Nations, receive reimbursement
for his expenses but "no salary, stipend fee or reward
whatsoever for their services" in order to prevent a post
of honor from also being a post of profit. JAMES
MADISON, RECORDS OF THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, 137-41 (GPO 1927). Madison
reports that "[n]o debate ensued, and the proposition was
postponed for the consideration of the members. It was
treated with great respect, but rather for the author of it,
than from any apparent conviction of its expediency or
practicality." Id, at 141.
146. The Associated Press recently reported a story in
which it was stated that Jesse Helms, Senator from North
Carolina and Chairman of the Senate Committee which is
supposed to report to the full Senate as to whether to
approve appointments of those nominated by the
President for posts as ambassadors to other countries,
refused to hold hearings on the appointment of one nomi-
nee because the nominee refused to treat him with "due
deference." The newspapers, television, and tabloids are
full of stories about personal details of the lives of British
royalty and others viewed as the "upper" classes - the
wealthy, movie stars, business tycoons, and politicians.
Few Americans would dream of walking unimpeded into
their Senator's or President's office and saying, "Brother,
why are you opposing what the people want?" a regular
event in the life of any Tribal leader.
147. A title of respect or honor. In olden times a lord,
knight, or gentleman. See 24 WORLD BOOK
ENCYCLOPEDIA DICTIONARY 1950 (1990).
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148. A title, originally the abbreviation of Master. See
id at 1361.
149. A title for a married woman, used to denote a
woman head of household. See id Misses was used for
unmarried women. The title Ms. has been invented sim-
ply to create a title which does not denote whether the
woman is married. See id
150. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE reprinted in
STORY, supra note 117, at 275.
151. See, e.g., NORMAN COOMBS, THE BLACK EXPERIENCE
IN AMERICA (1972).
152. See U. S. CoNsT., art. 11, §§ 2 & 3.
153. During the revolutionary period and until sometime
after the adoption of the Constitution, the primary interest
of the federal government of the United States was to
attract the sympathy and loyalty of the Indian Tribes to
their cause - even though they were hesitant to use the
Tribes as full allies in their dispute with Great Britain.
See generally GREGORY SCHAAF, WAMPUM BELTS AND
PEACE TaEs (1990); BAIwARA GRAvmoNT, THE IROQUOIS
IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1972); LAWS OF THE
COLONIAL AND STATE GovERNMENTs RELATING TO INDIANS
AND INDIAN AFFAIRS FROM 1633 TO 1831 WITH AN
APPENDIX CONTAINING THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATION (Earl M. Coleman ed.
1979), hereinafter "Coleman." At page 10 of this
Appendix, there is an entry dated August 19, 1776 where-
in the Congress instructed its Indian Commissioners to
"make diligent inquiry into the murder lately committed
by Indians in the neighborhood of Pittsburge ... [and]
they demand due punishment on the offender or offend-
ers, which being granted, this Congress will not consider
the same as a national act."
154. See Coleman, supra note 153. While these colonial
laws are full of provisions attempting to prevent fraud
upon Indians and intrusion into the Indian country, they
do contain a few provisions attempting to apply the crimi-
nal law of the colonies to Indian under certain circum-
stances. A non-exclusive list includes: provisions exclud-
ing Negroes and Indians from being abroad after dark, id
at 53 (Rhode Island, 1696); capital offenses committed by
Indians in the "remote parts of the Provence", id. at 139
(Pennsylvania, 1744); murders committed by Indians
within the colony, see id. at 150 (Virginia, 1665); pro-
hibiting Indians from giving testimony except against
"negroes, mulattoes, or Indians," id at 153 (Virginia,
1777); punishment for Indians committing offenses with-
in settled part of colony, and providing for joint colonial -
tribal resolution of trade disputes between Indians and
whites, id. at 161 (North Carolina, 1715); and specifically
declaring murder to include the killing of a "free Indian"
by a white person because "there is reason to believe that
several ill-disposed persons have not considered such
inhuman actions in a proper light, but being influenced by
the ill-grounded prejudices which ignorant minds are apt
to conceive against persons differing in colour from
themselves" (i.e. not thinking of the danger of involving
the province in a bloody and expensive war), id. at 185
(Georgia, 1774).
155. An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the
Indian Tribes, and to Preserve Peace on the Frontiers,
Approved, March 30, 1802, reprinted in Coleman, supra
note 153, at Appendix 33.
156. Seeid. at§ 1.
157. See id. at § 14, Appendix, page 39.
158. An Act to Provide for the Punishment of Crimes
and Offences Committed within the Indian Boundaries,
Approved March 3, 1817, reprinted in Coleman, supra
note 153, at Appendix 48.
159. These provisions are now contained in 18 U.S.C. §
1152 (1994).
160. State v. George Tassels [Corn Tassel] I Dud. 229
(Geo. 1830). This case is described in SIDNEY HARRING,
CROW DOG'S CASE 25-56 (1994). Although the United
States Supreme Court had issued its Writ of Error on
December 12, 1830 to review the case after the Georgia
Supreme Court had confirmed Corn Tassels' conviction
in the State court for killing another Cherokee within the
Cherokee Country, the Georgia legislature meeting in spe-
cial session voted to defy the Writ. Corn Tassels was
hung on December 24, 1830. Three days later the State
of Georgia was served with the subpoena for Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. I (1831).
161. See Worcester v. State of Georgia, 31 U.S. 515
(1832).
162. See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883). For a
thorough discussion of this case, and the application of
Anglo-American criminal law to the Indian Country see
HARRING, supra note 160, at 25-56.
163. Act of March 3, 1885, Ch. 341, 23 Stat. 362
(1885). The current version of this statute may be found
at 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
164. 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
165. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
Cold Steel
The mention of Indians in the constitution
which has received most attention is that found
in the clause which gives congress 'power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes.' This clause is relied on in the argument
in the present case, the proposition being that the
statute under consideration is a regulation of
commerce with the Indian tribes. But we think it
would be a very strained construction of this
clause that a system of criminal laws for Indians
living peaceably in their reservations, which left
out the entire code of trade and intercourse laws
justly enacted under that provision, and
established punishments for the common-law
crimes of murder, manslaughter, arson, burglary,
larceny, and the like, without any reference to
their relation to any kind of commerce, was
authorized by the grant of power to regulate
commerce with the Indian tribes. While we are
not able to see in either of these clauses of the
constitution and its amendments any delegation
of power to enact a code of criminal law for the
punishment of the worst class of crimes known
to civilized life when committed by Indians,
there is a suggestion in the manner in which the
Indian tribes are introduced into that clause




168. The Court completely ignored its three year old
decision in Exparte KAN-GI-SHUN-CA (otherwise
known as Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556 (1883), in which the
Court stated:
The pledge to secure to these people, with whom
the United States was contracting as a distinct
political body, an orderly government, by
appropriate legislation thereafter to be framed
and enacted, necessarily implies, having regard
to all the circumstances attending the
transaction, that among the arts of civilized life,
which it was the very purpose of all these
arrangements to introduce and naturalize among
them, was the highest and best of all,-that of
self-government, the regulation by themselves of
their own domestic affairs, the maintenance of
order and peace among their own members by
the administration of their own laws and
customs", and further, "by Indians against each
other were left to be dealt with by each tribe for
itself, according to its local customs.
See also United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 617
(1876):
The tribes for whom the act of 1854 was made
were those semi-independent tribes whom our
government has always recognized as exempt
from our laws, whether within or without the
limits of an organized state or territory, and, in
regard to their domestic government, left to their
own rules and traditions, in whom we have
recognized the capacity to make treaties, and
with whom the governments, state and national,
deal, with a few exceptions only, in their national
or tribal character, and not as individuals.
169. Among the provisions of the Declaration of
Independence, through which these same Americans had
expressed their reasons for revolt against their King was:
He has combined, with others, to subject us to a
jurisdiction foreign to our constitution, and
unacknowledged by our laws; giving his assent
to their acts of pretended legislation; . . . For
depriving us, in many cases, of the benefits of
trial by jury: [i.e. preventing them from
answering charges of wrongdoing according to
their own customs and traditions]; For
transporting us beyond seas [off the reservation]
to be tried for pretended offences; . .. For...
declaring themselves invested with power to
legislate for us, in all cases whatsoever ....
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1776) reprinted in MR.
JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPoSITION OF THE
CONSTITUnON OF THE UNITED STATES 275 (1840).
170. See text at notes 19-23.
171. Codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994).
172. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
173. The Supreme Court, based in part upon the fact that
the Bill of Rights of the American Constitution does not
apply to the Indian Tribes, Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376
(1896), and that the Indian Civil Rights Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1302, does not provide for a completely equivalent set
of rights in criminal cases in tribal courts, decided that
Indian people do not put white people in jail for viola-
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tions of Tribal law. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
435 U.S. 191 (1978). Although it attempted to extend
this ruling to citizens of other Tribes, Duro v. Reina, 495
U.S. 676 (1990), Congress acted to reverse that decision.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994).
174. There are some exceptions, no indictment is
required, see Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896), nor
are the Tribes required to provide counsel for a defendant
who is unable to afford an attorney, although such defen-
dants are entitled to an attorney in the Tribal Court at
their own expense. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1994).
175. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
176. Ex Parte Tiger, 47 S.W. 304, 305 (1898).
177. See Hon. Robt. Yazzie, "Hozho Nahasdlu "- We
Are Now In Good Relations: Navajo Restorative Justice,
9 St. Thomas L. Rev. 117 (1996); Hon. Robt. Yazzie,
"Life Comes From It ": Navajo Justice Concepts, 24
N.M. L. REV. 175 (1994).
178. See FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS
(1995); Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Court
Jurisprudence: A Snapshot From the Field, 21 VERMONT
L. REV. (1996).
179. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); National
Farmer's Union v. Crow Tribe of Indians 471 U.S. 845
(1985); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante 480 U.S. 9 (1987);
Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
180. Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and the Federal
Judiciary: Opportunities and Challenges for a
Constitutional Democracy, 58 MONT. L. REV. 313 (1997);
Robert Laurence, The Dominant Society s Judicial
Reluctance to Allow Tribal Civil Law to Apply to Non-
Indians: Reservation Diminishment, Modern Demography
and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 30 U. RICH L. REV. 781
(1996).
181. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
182. 117 S.Ct. 1404(1997).
183. Congress has recognized this. See Indian Self-
Determination Act, 25 U.S.C. 450a (1994).
184. Joseph Brant, quoted in Isabel Thompson Kelsay,
JOSEPH BRANT (1984) (citing 6 AMERICAN MUSEUM 226-
27 reprinted in THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN -
INDIAN VOICES FROM EARLY AMERICA 179-80 (Colin G.
Galloway ed. 1994)). Joseph Brant was a Mohawk and
prominent leader ofIroquois warriors. He is supposed to
have made this reply in 1789 to a question regarding
whether he thought Indians living in a "state of nature"
were as happy as white people living in "civilization."
185. See, e.g., Ray Halbritter with Steven Paul McSloy,
Empowerment or Dependence? The Practical Value and
Meaning of Native American Sovereignty, 26 N.Y. U. J.
INT'L L & Bus 531 (1994).
186. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom
and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REv. 225 (1994).
187. See Gloria Valencia-Weber and Christine P. Zuni,
Domestic Violence and Tribal Protection of Indigenous
Women in the United States, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 69
(1995). See, also, Allison M. Dussias, Science,
Sovereignty, and the Sacred Text: Paleontological
Resources and Native American Rights, 55 MD L. REV.
84(1996).
188. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Reconciling Federal and
State Power Inside Indian Reservations with The Right of
Tribal Self-government and the Process of Self-determina-
tion, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1105 (1995).
189. See Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal
Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How the Anglo-
American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies,
28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235 (1997).
190. See Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism for
Indian Tribes: The Relationship Between the United
States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and
Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 617 (1994).
191. See Kirke Kickingbird, A Tour on the Prairies or
Washington Irving and the "Horseless Headman ": A
Stroll with Congress, the Court and Indian Nations at the
Turn of the Century, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 125 (1996);
Vine Deloria, Jr., Minorities and the Social Contract, 20
Ga. L. Rev. 917 (1986); James W. Zion and Robert
Yazzie, Indigenous Law in North America in the Wake of
Conquest, 20 B.C. INT'L & CoMp. L. REV. 55 (1997).
192. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., "The People of the
States Where They Are Found Are Often Their Deadliest
Enemies ": The Indian Side of the Story of Indian Rights
and Federalism, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 981, 985-86 (1996);
Rebecca Tsosie, Negotiating Economic Survival: the
Consent Principle and Tribal-state Compacts under the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 29 ARuz. ST. L.J. 25, 29
(1997); Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom
and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. REv. 225, 228 (1994);
Kirke Kickingbird, A Tour on the Prairies or Washington
Irving and the "Horseless Headman ": A Stroll with
Cold Steel
Congress, the Court and Indian Nations at the Turn of the
Century, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 125, 125-26 (1996).
193. See generally Vine Deloria, Jr., Minorities and the
Social Contract, 20 GA. L. REv. 917 (1986); NORMAN
CooMas, THE BLACK EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA (1972)
(published electronically in 1993) <http://ftp.sunet.se/
ftp/pub/etext/wiretap-classic-library/blackexp.txt>.
194.
The Indian nations had always been considered
as distinct, independent political communities,
retaining their original natural rights, as the
undisputed possessors of the soil, from time
immemorial, with the single exception of that
imposed by irresistible power, which excluded
them from intercourse with any other European
potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of
the particular region claimed: and this was a
restriction which those European potentates
imposed on themselves, as well as on the
Indians. The very term 'nation,' so generally
applied to them, means 'a people distinct from
others.' The constitution, by declaring treaties
already made, as well as those to be made, to be
the supreme law of the land, has adopted and
sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian
nations, and consequently admits their rank
among those powers who are capable of making
treaties. The words 'treaty' and 'nation' are
words of our own language, selected in our
diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by
ourselves, having each a definite and well
understood meaning. We have applied them to
Indians, as we have applied them to the other
nations of the earth. They are applied to all in
the same sense.
... 'Tributary and feudatory states,' says
Vattel, 'do not thereby cease to be sovereign and
independent states, so long as self government
and sovereign and independent authority are left
in the administration of the state.' At the present
day, more than one state may be considered as
holding its right of self government under the
guarantee and protection of one or more allies.
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct
community occupying its own territory, with
boundaries accurately described, in which the
laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the
citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but
with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or
in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of
congress. The whole intercourse between the
United States and this nation, is, by our
constitution and laws, vested in the government
of the United States.
Worcester v. State of Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
195. See Rennard Strickland, Genocide-at-Law: An
Historic and Contemporary View of the Native American
Experience, 34 KAN. L. REv. 713, 719-21 (1986) (arguing
that federal actions dispossessing Indian tribes from
their lands during 19th century and attempting to force
tribal people to assimilate should be characterized as
genocidal in impact); Conference: Race, Law and
Justice: the Rehnquist Court and the American Dilemma,
45 AM. UL. Rev. 567, 608-11 (1996); Judith V. Royster,
The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIz. ST. L. J. I (1995).
See, e.g., Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples as Agreed Upon by the Members of the Working
Group at its Eleventh Session, UNESCOR, Comm'n on
Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, 45th Sess., Ann. 1, Agenda
Item 14, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29 (1993); Act of
Nov. 4, 1988, Pub. L. 100-606, §2(a), 102 Stat. 3045, as
amended Sept. 13, 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, Title VI, by
§60003(a)(13), 108 Stat. 1970.
196. See Vine Deloria, Jr., Minorities and the Social
Contract, 20 GA. L. REv. 917 (1986).
